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1. Introduction 
The Congo war, which is best described as the African net of wars due to the multiplicity of actors 
involved in it, started in 1998. The economic interests and political ambitions of the neighboring 
states and their support from western states worsened the internal conflicts in the country. The 
country became a “battlefield” of all these external actors (among which Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, 
Burundi, Namibia, Zimbabwe, some of which supported by western states) and internal actors (the 
militias and other groups). This destructive war took lives of 3.5 million of people1 and ruined the 
economy of the country, which was already devastated by the long decades of harsh colonialism 
and further its patrimonial rulers, who were mostly interested in self enrichment and power, rather 
than establishing a stable and well-functioning state. The DRC today is one of the poorest countries 
in the world despite the fact that they are in possession of enormous amount of natural resources. 
The country is occupying one of the last places in the list of Human Development Index.  
In spite of positive developments in Congo with democratic elections taking place in 
2006, the situation in the country remains unstable. The violence still occurs in the parts of the 
country and the state is unable to fully control the situation. Estimated 1000 people loose their lives 
everyday due to direct or indirect cause of war, especially due to malnutrition, diseases and 
violence2. 
  Since the beginning of the war the international community has been making efforts to 
establish peace and assist the country’s economic development and support the democratic 
transition. Numerous peace accords were signed between the parties of the war, the UN is engaged 
in the country with the MONUC Mission, the EU and some of its member states are also involved 
in the peace building process in the country, however, with very limited results.  
In 2003 after the call from the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, the EU has 
launched its first independent military operation in the Eastern province of the DRC, Ituri, which 
succeeded to establish short-term peace in the province among other results, such as revival of 
international humanitarian assistance to the province and the re-activation of MONUC Mission. 
Moreover, the EU has different missions and programs that support the economic development, 
democratic transition of the Congolese state, security sector reforms as well as the reforms in 
judiciary and government.   
The complexity of the DRC case and the involvement of international actors in the 
peace building process led to a number of researches in this area. However, the most of the research 
                                                 
1 In the period of 1998-2004 estimated 3.5 million of people died (Faria, 2004) 
2 International Crisis Group: http://www.crisisgroup.org/ - extracted on 05 May, 2008 
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conducted until now is more concentrated on explaining how the EU’s instruments and actions 
outside the EU can be explained in the terms of the EU’s capabilities and EU’s role in the world. 
Our ambition for this project is to expand the existing research by taking another 
perspective. Thus we don’t want to examine what do these actions (policies and instruments) mean 
for the EU but, rather we want to study to what extent the EU instruments are having an impact on 
establishing peace in conflict areas. Therefore, for the purpose of this project, we are going to look 
at the outcomes of the EU policies in the DRC and whether these instruments are effective and are 
contributing to the peace building process in the country. Moreover, in order to have a complete 
picture on how the EU is influencing the peace building process it is important to present how EU’s 
security and development policy evolved and whether the EU’s Africa policy were affected by the 
events of 9/11.    
 
Thus, in order to accomplish this study the following research questions will be answered:    
 
Do the EU policies towards DR Congo contribute to sustainable peace in the country? What 
determines the outcomes of these policies?  
 
The sub-questions:  
 
- How the EU policy towards Africa has been developing since the end of the Cold War?  
- What impacts have the EU policies on the establishment of sustainable peace in the DRC?  
- What are the factors that determine these outcomes?  
                   a) What are the EU factors that affect the outcomes? 
                   b) What are the DRC domestic outcomes, which affect the outcomes? 
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2. Methodology  
In this section we are going to present the choices made by us for our research study. It will include 
issues on how problem formulation needs to be answered and which methodological instruments 
will be used for our analysis. The section will include empirical data, case study as methodological 
tool, time limit, data, theoretical design, delimitation, limitations, research framework and structure 
of the project.  
2.1. Case study  
Our study is a single case study research. “The case study is but one of several ways of doing social 
science research” (Yin, 2003: 1). The case study as a method is defined in the literature “as the 
intensive study of a single case where the purpose of the study is - at least in part - to shed light on a 
larger class of cases” (Gerring, 2006: 20). According to Yin the case study is an empirical inquiry   
that explores “a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003: 13). Traditionally 
the case study has been associated with qualitative methods of analysis. However, Gerring argues 
that case study may employ a great variety of techniques, both quantitative and qualitative. This is 
one of the intriguing qualities of the case study research and lends that research its characteristic 
flexibility (Gerring, 2006). The single case study may be used to confirm, challenge or extend a 
theory. Thus, the single case study can be used to “determine whether a theory’s propositions are 
correct or whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant” (Yin, 2003: 40). 
We are going to conduct our case study by using mainly qualitative methods. 
However, we are going to complement our research with quantitative methods, such as statistical 
data. In this context we going to use statistics related to the EU financial assistance towards 
Democratic Republic of Congo. As primary sources for our study we are going to use Cotonou 
Agreement, European Security Strategy (ESS).  Our secondary literature is based on researches 
done by Goran Hyden, Gorm Rye Olsen, Barry Buzan among other scholars.   
The factors that determined us to choose Congo as our empirical case are the 
following. First of all, the case of DRC represents a very complex case in many ways. The conflict 
of DRC remains one of the world’s worst and most forsaken humanitarian crises. The conflict and 
humanitarian crisis have taken the lives of the 3.5 million people since 1998, this classifying DRC 
conflict as words deadliest documented conflict since the World War II. Despite the fact that the 
DRC conflict officially ended up in 2003 and despite having their first elected president after 40 
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years and living in a country, rich in minerals, gold and diamonds, the country remains on of the 
most unstable, insecure and with lowest economic development in the world.  
Secondly, the DRC constitutes a testifying ground for international community 
capacity to intervene in peace building process in African states. The main challenge for 
international community is how to rebuild a failed state and how to make their instruments and 
policies effective. Thus in this context the DRC raises the question on how the EU can have an 
impact on the peace building process in this country by using its instruments based on security and 
development policies. Furthermore it will be interesting to see what are the determinants of the 
EU’s effectiveness/ or ineffectiveness on the ground. 
Thirdly, DRC is a relevant case when proving that EU’s policies towards Africa 
launched after 2001 are “nevertheless structured and restrained by policy choices and institutional 
preferences established before September 2001”(Olsen, 2008: 2) and have nothing to do with the 
war on terror. Rather they have to be explained with reference to the EU as a civilian/ normative 
power.   
Finally, the DRC also raises challenges for the EU’s capabilities in peace building 
process, and the EU’s ability to cooperate with other international actors, such as UN, USA, which 
are involved in establishing sustainable peace in the DRC.  
2.2. Concepts  
For methodological considerations, it is important to discuss and analyse the EU as a peace-builder 
through two level approaches. In the first level we will discuss the EU in general within the broader 
context of the security and development policies and how these policies evolved. On the second 
level we will present particularly the EU’s activities in the DRC and the effectiveness of these 
instruments.  
For our research purpose it is also essential to define the concept of peace building. 
According to Reychler and Paffenholz the “term peace building refers to all the efforts required on 
the way to the creation of a sustainable peace zone” (Reychler and Paffenholz et al cited in Kinell, 
2007: 7). So in this context the peace building concept needs to be understood as a way of 
transforming a conflict by addressing all the main components of it, by “fixing the problems, which 
threaten the core interests of the parties; changing the strategic thinking; and changing the 
opportunity structure and the ways of interacting” (Reychler cited in Bassey and Oshita, 2007: 14). 
According to some scholars peace building process takes place after a conflict has 
finished and the parties have agreed a political settlement, a settlement “written and enforced by the 
international society” (Bellamy et al cited in Kinell, 2007: 7). However, according to others 
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building peace should not be limited to a certain phase of the conflict (Kinell, 2007: 11). We are 
applying this last approach, where the peace building process is not limited to certain phase of the 
conflict. The general goal of peace building is to construct an environment “of sustainable peace, 
i.e. the absence of armed violence; the absence of structural, psychological and cultural 
discrimination; a constructive transformation conflicts; and both external and internal legitimacy” 
(Jeong, 2005: 92). 
It is important to mention that an essential part of the peace building process is to 
address the roots of the conflict, as these must be addressed if the conflict is to be solved. Thus the 
roots of the conflict are another variable that is going to be applied in our research. According to B. 
Møller, ethnic tensions, state-building issues, “privatization of security”, economic factors, pillage, 
commercialization of war and environmental factors are some of the interrelated major roots of the 
conflicts in Africa (Møller, 2001: 3-4). In out empirical case the following roots of the conflict are 
identified: ethnic dimension, external dimension, state building dimension, privatization of 
security and economic factor. 
The ethnic dimension consists of the ethnic tensions that cause wars and conflicts. In 
the case of DRC war the conflict between the ethnic groups was of primary importance among other 
factors. The ethnic tensions not only internally within the DRC but also in the neighbouring 
countries, such as Rwanda and Burundi, have contributed to the conflict in the DRC. By the term 
external dimension, we want to emphasize on the involvement of other neighbouring and 
international actors that have contributed largely to the conflict in DRC. Thus the governments and 
the militias of neighbouring states (Rwanda, Uganda etc) were supporting different parts of the 
conflict and thus intensifying the complexity of the conflict. As the international actors are 
concerned the states as USA, Belgium and France have been supporting the different parts of the 
conflict.  
Another root of the conflict closely related to the previous one refers to the state 
building dimension. In DRC, as well as in many other states of Africa, this process of the state 
building was a very short time process, while the state-building process in the European countries 
continued for centuries. The tradition of state building with territorial affiliation is a very new and 
foreign phenomenon on the African continent, where the only country, which had a pre-colonial 
tradition of the state, was Ethiopia. Thus this short term, rapid process has been very inefficient and 
painful. Moreover, during the colonial times the Belgian colonizers did not contribute at all to the 
providing the locals with the capability to self-govern their country, which left the Congolese 
people with lack of knowledge and experience in state-building process after their independence. 
“The African states have to accomplish this gargantuan task within predetermined and often 
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completely artificial and irrational borders, not having the right to wage such wars over territory as 
the European states fought as part of their state-building enterprise” (Møller, 2001: 3). 
The inefficient functioning of the state apparatus, has led to privatization of the 
security. Thus, the security issues, which supposed to be a matter of the state police or army, have 
got into the private hands. As a result the state has lost the full control over them and “the state is 
unable to compete with the private security companies (PSCs), e.g. with regard to wages, leading to 
a further weakening of the state as an institution and a further strengthening of the PSCs – with 
deteriorating security concerned as a long term result” (Møller, 2001: 3). Furthermore, the private 
military and police are sometimes more efficient then this of state and these “have no loyalty to the 
state or nation, but ‘follow the money’” (Møller, 2001: 4).  
The economic factor is also an important variable when identifying the roots of the 
conflict. The unequal distribution of the resources, the growing poverty leads to the conflict over 
the scarce resources. Although the DRC is one of the richest countries in the African continent in 
mineral and natural resources, the lack of proper economic policies contribute largely to the violent 
conflicts. In relation to the economic factors, the fight over the resources available, especially the 
natural resources, are adding to the instability. “An abundance of resources, combined with weak 
state structures, may be seen by other states and non-state actors as a standing invitation to pillage, 
especially as far as resources in the extractive sectors are concerned” (Møller, 2001: 4). This 
situation of fight over the natural resources involves not only the internal actors, but also the 
foreign, neighbouring states and actors. Thus in the situation of the DRC, the struggle over the 
resources have been one of the reasons of the long conflicts.  
Other explanatory concepts which we are going to apply in order to explain the 
outputs of the peace building process refers to two groups of explanatory factors: European factor 
and domestic factor. When European factor is concerned the main goal is to explain whether the 
Union has the appropriate instruments and institutional framework necessary for an effective 
intervention in DRC. The effectiveness of EU instruments and institutional framework in peace 
building process in DRC are going to be measured by taking into consideration the consistency, 
clearness and the coherence of EU policies and the coordination among EU institutions as 
well. 
In regard to domestic factor, this also constitutes an important factor when the peace 
building process needs to be addressed. By domestic factor we mean state’s capabilities, structure of 
the state, domestic political elites.  
Lastly, in the following scheme we provide the summarized version of peace building 
approach and the way it is applied in our project.  
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Dimensions Explanation 
Actors of peace building  EU 
Instrument of peace building  Security and development policies  
Time aspect in the peace 
building process  
Long term  
Effectiveness  Dependent on two categories of factors  
1. EU factors (consistency, clearness and the coherence of the EU 
policies, coordination among EU institutions) 
2. Domestic factors (structure of the state, state’s capabilities, 
domestic political elites)  
2.3. Time limit  
Empirically, our study investigates the EU’s instruments developed towards Africa from the end of 
the Cold War until today. When DRC is concerned we emphasis mainly on EU’s instrument 
towards the country launched from 2002 until nowadays.  
Time is an important factor and needs to be taken into consideration, when applying 
Europeanization approach. It is important to mention that change through EU policies may occur 
both in short and long term. However, it is important to mention that when peace building process is 
concerned, the time is an important factor, mainly because the peace building process is a long-term 
engagement that requires wide and coherent efforts and involves a wide range of issues, and thus 
the peace building outcomes can be evaluated properly in long run.  
2.4. Theoretical design  
For our theoretical framework we are going to use Historical institutionalism and Europeanization. 
Complementary to the Europeanization approach we are going to use the concepts of weak states, 
which were built up in International relation theory and in the Development studies. The way we 
are applying these concepts and theories is explained in the section of Applicability of theories.  
2.5. Delimitations  
The delimitation made by us in this study refers to the following. The first delimitation, which we 
need to make, is a thematic one. When using all theoretical approaches and instruments, our study is 
limited to the EU’s involvement in the field of peace building process. Geographically this research 
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is restricted to Africa and particularly to the Democratic Republic of Congo. On the policy level we 
are emphasizing on EU security and development/ humanitarian aid policies.   
Furthermore, when conceptualizing EU’s “actorness”, we assume that EU is civilian/ 
normative by nature. For the purpose of this study we are not going to look on the member states’ 
interests and at the processes which EU formulated security and development policies.  
We will assume that the EU is acting as a single actor. This means that no concern is 
made in regard to the individual state’s preferences. However, the fact that individual states 
maintain their distinct national foreign policy is going to be taken into the consideration to the 
extent to which this is weakening EU’s coherency and effectiveness in the peace building process in 
the DRC. In our case a special role is played by France.  
When applying the Europeanization approach, the delimitation that is made refers to 
the fact that we are not looking at the process of Europeanization inside the EU, but rather we will 
extend the applicability of it to the third countries and we will limit its applicability to the field of 
peace building.  
Finally, when we use the term European institutions in this research we mean mainly 
the Commission and the Council of the EU. Due to the fact that EU’s Africa policy consists of two 
separate fields –development and security and each is characterized with different actors, 
Commission in the development assistance field and the Council in the security field, the emphasis 
will be made only on these two institutions.   
2.6. Limitations  
Any research is subject to limitation of some forms. This study is itself no exception of the rule. The 
limitations in our project refer to the following issues. The first limitation refers to the 
Europeanization approach. We are aware that the outputs of the peace building process in the DRC 
are not only due to the EU; there are other processes on the ground, such as globalization, which 
have an impact on the peace building process in the country. 
Secondly, closely related to the first limitation, when the international actors are 
concerned we limited our study only to the EU, in spite of the fact that other international actors are 
also involved in peace building process, such as UN, USA among others.   
2.7. Research framework 
We are going to conduct our analysis in three analytical steps. Firstly, we are going to examine the 
evolution of the EU’s Africa policy. In this context we are going to map EU’s security and 
development policies. On this background we are going to testify the historical institutionalism 
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approach and argue that the Africa policy of the EU after 2001 are in essence a continuation of 
policies that were already in place prior to 9/11. 
Secondly, we are going to examine what the EU has accomplished by using security 
and development policies in the DRC and how this contributes to the peace building process in the 
country. Thus, peace building process needs to be judged by its outcomes rather than its objectives.  
On the third level of analysis we will study what are the main factors that determine 
the outputs of the peace building process. The main attention will be given to EU’s factors and DRC 
domestic factors.  
2.8. Structure of the project 
Our study will have the following structure: 
In Chapter III we are going to present the theories and concepts which will be applied to our 
empirical case. Our theoretical framework includes the Historical Institutionalism, Europeanization 
approach and the weak and strong state theories. In Chapter IV we are presenting our empirical 
case. First a presentation of the development of the EU development and security policies towards 
Africa will be introduced, followed by the presentation of the DR Congo’s historical background, 
political situation and the origins of the conflict. Further in the chapter, we will present the 
Operation Artemis and other security and development instruments the EU used towards DRC.  
Our analysis is conducted in Chapter V. This Chapter has two sub-analyses, first of 
which will be on the development of the EU development and security policy towards Africa using 
the Historical Institutionalism. The second part will include the impact of the EU policies in DRC 
and the actions taken by the EU towards the roots of the conflict. Furthermore, the EU factors, 
which affect the effectiveness of the peace building process in DRC will be analyzed followed by 
the DRC domestic factors, influencing on the peace building in the country. Our Conclusion will be 
in the Chapter VI followed by the Chapter VII on Perspectivation, where we will discuss whether 
there is a solution to the Congo conflict, on the role of the international community and future 
research.   
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3. Theoretical framework 
In this chapter, we will present our theoretical framework, which consists of historical 
institutionalism, Europeanization approach, weak and strong state arguments.  
3.1. Historical institutionalism   
In order to look at the evolution of the development and security policies of the EU towards the 
African continent, we are going to apply a historical institutionalism approach. Historical 
institutionalism took up a position in between rational choice and sociological institutionalism. 
Historical institutionalism “focuses on the effects of the institutions over time, in particular, the 
ways in which a given set of the institutions, once established, can influence or constrain the 
behavior of the actors who established them” (Hall and Taylor in Pollak, 2005: 139). Put it 
differently, “the policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or when a policy is 
initiated, will have a continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the 
future” (Peters, 2005: 71). According to Krasner and Pierson, the standard term for describing this 
argument is path dependency (Peters, 2005). Thus, this means that when a government program or 
organization embarks upon a path, there is an inertial tendency for those initial policy choices to 
persist. However, it is important to emphasize that this path may be altered, but it requires a good 
deal of political pressure to produce that change. 
In order to see how much historical institutionalism can explain, the following issues 
need to be explored: what is an institution in a historical institutionalism approach, how institutions 
are formed and how they change, how individuals relate to institution and institutional design. In 
the historical institutionalism approach one element that stands out when defining institutions is the 
role of the ideas in defining institutions. The key feature of the historical institutionalisms is the 
overall claim, that first an institution is created and the initial policy choices have been made, they 
are not easily changed. The historical institutionalism is more concerned about the persistence of 
the institutions after they are formed than it is on the facts of their initial creation (Peters, 2005). To 
some degree the emphasis on embodying ideas in the structures that support institutions may be 
taken as a definition of the formation of institutions.  
What may be of importance for the question of formation in historical institutionalism 
is the definition of when that creation occurs. In this context the choice of the relevant date from 
which to count future developments will be essential for making the case that those initial patterns 
will persist and shape subsequent policies in the policy area (Peters, 2005). 
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One area where historical institutionalism might be expected to have particularly 
difficult time coping with is the question of institutional change. Thus, historical institutionalism 
approach appears to explain better the persistence of patterns than to explain how these patterns 
might change. However, in order to understand change, or the relative lack of change in this 
approach, it is important first to conceptualize how the notion of the path dependency operates. In 
this context, Paul Pierson mentioned that “path dependence can be explained through positive 
feedback from the initial policy choices and the manner in which that feedback reinforces those 
initial policy choices” (Pierson in Peters, 2005: 77). Another concept through which historical 
institutionalism approach has treated change is the term of punctuated equilibria. As this term 
implies, there is an expectation in the approach that for most of its existence an institution will exist 
in an equilibrium state, functioning in accordance with the decisions made at its initiation, or 
possibly those made at the previous point of punctuation. According to Collier, another way to look 
at the process of change in historical institutionalism is the idea of critical junctures (Collier in 
Peters, 2005). The main argument of this concept is that change would not occur until unless there 
was a conjuncture of a variety of political forces that individually were not capable of generating 
significant change but which together could produce such transformations.  
As mentioned above the role of ideas is a central part in historical institutionalism 
approach thus it is important to reveal that institutional change to some extent becomes a question 
of how to change ideas. In this context of historical institutionalism thinking it is quite important to 
emphasize on Paul Pierson approach. Pierson suggested that “political institution and public 
policies are often characterized by what economists call “increasing returns”, insofar as those 
institutions and policies generate incentives for actors to stick with and not abandon existing 
institution, adapting them only incrementally to changing political environments” (Pierson quoted 
in Wiener and Diez, 2005: 140). Pierson states that as long as political institutions and public 
policies are characterized by increasing returns, politics will be characterized by certain interrelated 
phenomena (inertia, a critical role for timing and sequencing, path dependence). The most important 
is that Pierson points out that the existence of increasing returns to institutions is not a constant, but 
a variable, that can vary systematically across different types of political institutions and policies. 
Historical institutionalists are not particularly concerned with how individuals relate to 
the institutions within which they function. There is an implicit assumption of historical 
institutionalism that when individuals choose to participate in an institution they will accept the 
constrains imposed by that institution. 
Historical institutionalism approach is almost silent when it refers to the design of the 
institution. However Guy Peters argues that “design is perhaps the central question for historical 
 14
institutionalism, given that the initial choices of policies and structures are argued to be so 
determinate of subsequent decision within the institution” (Peters, 2005: 81). So, design may be 
determined by the selection of ideas that will motivate the institution during the rest of its existence. 
3.2. Europeanization concept 
Scholars of Europeanization have offered different definitions of the concept.3 In this context 
Caporaso, et al. defined Europeanization as a process that “involves the development of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, norms and practices governing politics at the European, national and 
sub-national level” (quoted in Featherstone and Radaeilli, 2003: 13). Another general definition of 
Europeanization, which can be quoted from the literature is that given by Ladraech, who defines 
Europeanization as “a process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EU 
political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and 
policy making” (quoted in Featherstone and Kazamias, 2000: 13). Thus, Europeanization as an 
analytical concept is used to study the changes in domestic structures and policies that take place in 
response to policies and practices institutionalized at the European level. More than that, it stands 
for a process in which European rules, mechanisms and collective understanding interact with given 
domestic structures. However, none of these definitions created a link between Europeanization and 
the process of peace building in the third countries.   
Before moving to the definition of Europeanization taken by us for our research area, 
it is important to make a distinction between Europeanization approach in the EU context and 
Europeanization concept outside the EU borders. Europeanization literature fails to provide a 
theoretical approach towards the countries outside the European space and is not powerful enough 
in explaining the specific way in which changes occur at domestic level as a result of international 
influence and what factors, both external and internal, determine the emergence of one or another 
outcome. Several important factors are responsible for this state of affairs. The expansion of 
Europeanization research outside the EU states faces several difficulties. The promotion of different 
EU policies towards various groups of outsiders represents one of the obstacles in offering a 
research design that would offer a working classification of the EU level variables. Similarly, the 
diversity of intervening domestic level factors that determine the resistance to or the acceptance of 
European practices and “ways of doing things” causes troubles in advancing a framework for 
different groups of member states. Also another problem is the distinction between EU level 
influence and the involvement of other international actors and processes. Therefore, in order to 
                                                 
3 See Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli, The politics of Europeanization, Oxford University press, 2003, 
Johan P Olsen , The many faces of Europeanization” Arena working paper 2002 
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develop a theoretical framework suitable for our project, we will combine variables from the 
Europeanization studies together with variables from development studies. 
Due to the fact that our empirical case refers to a third world country the 
Europeanization approach is adjusted to a certain concept and refers to Europeanization as export of 
political organization and institutions, more specifically, it implies export of European norms, ideas 
and ways of organization, inclusive the European imperialism. This approach is complemented by 
the well-known position in the study of the foreign policy of the EU, which states that norms, 
ideologies and values potentially are important determinants of the external policies of the EU (Hill, 
2003; Hill and Wallace, 1996). It is a prominent position in the research on EU foreign policy that 
this particular type of policy is the result of ideas and beliefs held among leading decision-makers 
which operate on the idea that the European Community has a special role to play in the world, 
based on a number of fundamental ideas and beliefs (Hill, 2003; Ginsberg, 1999; Whitman, 1998; 
Manners 2002). The core of these ideas and beliefs is that the European community is a civilian 
power or, according to more resent approaches, the EU is a normative power (Manners, 2002).  
Furthermore it is important to mention that two major lines of reasoning dominate the 
theoretical approaches towards the study of the EU impact on domestic changes on non-member 
states. The first one builds on rationalist accounts and stresses that the power of the European 
influence derives from its direct pressure through material and political benefits provided by the 
EU. Another alternative reasoning is built on a constructivist understanding of the normative power 
of European Union. Thus EU liberal-democratic values and “ways of doing things” can be exported 
outside the EU boundaries through mechanisms of socialization and persuasion, depending on their 
attractiveness to domestic political and societal actors and their cultural and historical heritage. 
Based on these conceptual explanations, our working definition for this particular 
research question concerning the EU and the peace building in the third countries, is 
Europeanization as a mechanism and a process at the same time which is activated and encouraged 
by European institutions and policies by linking the final outcomes of the peace building process 
with the degree of the EU involvement. However our primary focus will not be on the mechanism 
of Europeanization but rather on the outputs of the EU’s impact and the determinants of these 
outputs.  
For the purpose of this study we will restrict the extent of applicability of the 
Europeanization concept in two ways. The first limitation is geographical, and refers to third 
countries, thus countries outside the EU and European space. The second limitation is a thematic 
one and refers to the establishing of sustainable peace in a third country through security and 
development policies launched by the EU.  
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As mentioned above our research design will cover the analysis of the two groups of 
explanatory variables: European factors and domestic variables. Two major variables from the EU 
level are brought into the theoretical equation. These are the nature and the degree of the EU 
pressure. The second one refers to the consistency, clearness and the coherence of EU policies. 
The outcomes of the Europeanization process highly depend on the nature and the degree of EU 
pressure. In this context scholars distinguished between two different types of the pressure: direct 
and indirect one. Thus, in the case of non-EU countries the EU pressure is indirect, this is due to the 
fact that the countries outside the EU are not bind by EU policies. Furthermore, is important to 
mention that the outside states of the EU are less affected by this process and do not have the 
institutional means to co-determine decisions of the EU that affect them.  
Concerning the EU pressure, this is measured as being high, medium, low and no 
pressure at all. When the countries outside the EU are concerned the degree of the pressure is 
considered as low, this is mainly because the EU is perhaps using more soft instruments, such as 
diffusion due to perceived efficiency and legitimacy and because EU’s conditionality is much 
weaker in the case of non-European outsiders. Concomitantly, because of the “soft nature” of the 
EU power in its external relations and its “positive approach” of “managed compliance” through 
open and constitutive dialogues, the sticks that the EU can apply in relations with the third states are 
also weaker (Borzel and Risse, 2004: 8). They are taken usually in the form of suspension clause of 
an agreement or the appropriate measures that can be taken by the partners of the agreement in the 
case of the violation of the agreement. 
The degree of clearness and coherence is another important requirement that is 
determining the outcomes of the Europeanization process. Thus the way the EU frames its policies 
largely determines the success of domestic transformations. The clarity and the coherency of the EU 
policy give more bargaining power to the EU and a more attractive involvement in monitoring the 
implementation of its requirements. In this context it is stated in the Europeanization literature that 
after establishing “some determinate rules of the game and nominating the responsible domestic 
players, the EU has the privilege in supervising the process of internal change and giving the 
required guidance when needed” (Timus, 2007:16). Thus, a weakly determined and non-coherent 
EU policy leads to uncertainty and different interpretations about the possible way of its 
implementation and it could even raise the question of implementation at all.  
In order to have a clear picture of the factor that determine the interaction between the 
EU and national/sub-national level one should examine also the domestic ones. The research carried 
out with regard to domestic level factors in countries outside European space is less systematic. 
However, it is mentioned in Europeanization research that the following domestic determinants 
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need to be brought into the theoretical framework. The first one refers to the domestic political 
elites, which as the main internal actors would tend to maximize their benefits (material ones) 
during the domestic changes occurring as a result of interaction with the EU. Another factor refers, 
as Borzel and Risse  states, to the internal institutional templates of decision making, such  as 
the structure of the state, electoral rule, the structure of the party system (Borzel and Risse, 2003). 
According to Vachudova important factors that could determine the outcomes of the EU policy are 
the type of the government, liberal or illiberal. So, a liberal government is more committed to 
implement the EU level policies, while the opposite situation is occurring in the case of an 
authoritarian-type government (Vachudova in Timus, 2007).  
Because of the lack of a clear framework vis-à-vis the domestic variables that could 
determine the EU’s policy outcomes, our ambitious is to expand the research of Europeanization 
approach to the development studies and thus to combine the variables mapped into the 
Europeanization approach with explanatory variables used in the development studies. The 
explanatory variables, which we are going to apply for our theoretical framework, are going to be 
presented in the next section.  
3.3. Weak and strong states 
In order to analyse the effectiveness of the peace building process it is important to see the domestic 
factors that can have an impact on this process. Therefore in the following section we are going to 
look at the state factor, its weaknesses and strengths, which may influence the peace building 
process in the country, from an international relations perspective developed by B. Buzan. This 
approach is strengthened by the arguments from the development studies on the states and its 
features in the Third World countries and particularly in Africa, based on the works of G. Hyden 
and M. Ayoob. This theoretical base will help us to understand how the African states respond to 
the peace building instruments of the international actors and how these states contribute 
themselves to establishment of sustainable peace in their countries.  
It is clear that the states are essential in the issues of security. Buzan defines the state 
as a relationship between the territory, government and society and the systemic dynamics of the 
ways these relate to each other. State “both provides the major binding holding the territorial – 
polity – society package together, and defines much of its character and power as an actor in the 
international system” (Buzan, 1991: 64). There are three interlinked components of the state which 
are essential for the security of the state and these are: the idea of the state, the physical base of the 
state and the institutional expression of the state. Thus the state must have a physical base of the 
state, which is a territory and population, together with the natural and human-made resources, the 
 18
institutions to govern this physical base and the idea of state, which establishes the legitimacy in the 
eyes of its population. 
The idea of the state concerns the notion of purpose. It is connected to the issues like 
why the state exists, what are its functions in relation to the society etc. “Ideas are a vital component 
of the state, essential to its coherence and purpose, and providing a mechanism for persuading 
citizens to subordinate themselves to the states authority” (Buzan, 1991: 83). There are two main 
sources of idea of state: nation and organizing ideologies. The nation is a “large group of people 
sharing the same cultural, and possibly the same ethnic or racial, heritage” (Buzan, 1991: 70). There 
is a strong connection between the nation and the state. There are four models of this relation 
between the nation and the state and most of the states have a combination of these features 
although one of these models is more dominant than others:  
 
1. Nation-state – this state is created by a nation, thus there is a close bound between the nation 
and the state. The nation-state is a state “whose people share a strong linguistic, religious, 
and symbolic identity” (Charles Tilly in Ayoob, 1995: 24). Thus the nationalism is a 
precondition for building of nation-state. The nation-state has clear territorial boundaries. 
2. The state-nation – here the state plays the instrumental role, where it is the state that is 
generating and propagating the common cultural norms, such as language, art etc, because 
the nation is the product of the state. It is a “product of the state-making enterprise rather 
than of nationalism or nation building” (Ayoob, 1995: 24). The more the state is well-
established the easier for it to provide the security, and the opposite, the less well-
established the state is, the more difficult for it to do this.  If the state fails to exist in 
harmony with its nations, they will remain vulnerable to threats to the state.  
3. The part nation-state – is a state which accommodates in itself two or more states, i.e. 
different states consisting of same nation. In this case, one state contests the legitimacy of 
the other (for example the two Koreas) and thus can be of threat to themselves and others. 
4. Multination state – is a state which contains 2-3 or more nations. There are “no national 
unifying principles, and consequently are more vulnerable to dismemberment, separatism 
and political interference than ate nation-states” (Buzan, 1991: 76). The multination state 
can be an imperial state where one nation dominates the state apparatus and might suppress 
the other nations in order to gain advantages. The suppression of other nations can happen 
through non-nationalist ideological means or through enforcing its position through state 
apparatus. Federative state is also one of these states, which can have vulnerable security. 
The ability of the dominating nation holding a power is defining the security in the state. In 
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case where this dominating nation has a low ability to control due to external or internal 
factors, the state can face a danger of total collapse.  
 
The idea of the state is very important to the security. “Unless the idea of the state is firmly planted 
in the minds of the population, the state as a whole has no secure foundation. Equally, unless the 
idea of the state is firmly planted in the “minds” of other states, the state has no secure 
environment” (Buzan, 1991: 78). The firm connection between the state and the nation is essential 
for the security of the state.  
The organizing ideology of the state is, on the other hand, less strong than the nation 
and this is a general identification with general principle, e.g. democracy, communism etc. 
Economic, social and religious issues can serve as an idea of the state as well. In some cases these 
ideas are deeply rooted in the state, when the change of these ideas will be a transformation process 
for the state. In other cases, like in most of the Third World countries, these ideas are shallower. 
“Since these ideologies address the bases of relations between government and society they define 
the condition for both harmony and conflict in domestic politics” (Buzan, 1991: 79). In the case 
where these ideas are weak the state has insecure political foundation. If these ideas are not widely 
held, it will not be considered as a state idea, but merely an idea of a particular group in the society. 
Moreover, if these ideas are strongly held but contested within the society, then the state is also 
vulnerable. Thus the strong idea of the state, when it is widely accepted by the society, is essential 
for the security. Even if the institutions of the state are weak, but the ideas are strong and widely 
held, then there is no threat to the security of the state.  
The institutions of the state is the machinery of the government, e.g. the laws, norms, 
executive, administrative, legislative branches. Whereas the ideas, as mentioned above, are essential 
component part of the state used for controlling the citizens of the state, the organizing ideologies 
are strongly linked to the government apparatus. The institutions of the state are necessary part of 
the state, which is supposed to enforce the ideas. “Strong idea of the state needs government 
machinery, and even strong institutions need, or at least prefer, to be supported by some ideas” 
(Buzan, 1991: 85). Ideas are much stronger and broader than the rule by coercion, because this rule 
by force will fade some day, it cannot sustain itself. Moreover, the rule by ideas is much more 
stable and less costly than the rule by coercion. However, if the population is apathetic because of, 
for instance, lack of political education, then the coercive rule might sustain itself. Furthermore, this 
coercive rule may maintain itself if the government is keeping on providing basic services to the 
population, such as security.  
 20
As mentioned above, the organizing ideologies are closely related to the institutions, 
they are indivisible. No ideas can be without institutions to enforce them and vice-versa, no 
institutions would be without the idea to give them definition and reason. The stability of the 
institutions and the popular support of the government is an important factor in the security of the 
state. Since the institutions of the state are physical entities, they are vulnerable to physical 
challenges. Moreover, the state institutions will be weakened by large ideological changes, this will 
require the institutions to adapt to these changes. However, in a state with widely established ideas, 
the institutional change may happen without disrupting the state stability. Besides that, the threat to 
the institutions may come from the internal factors, such as internal opposing groups, militias and 
other. Changes in the government, however, may affect the internal behaviour, since the 
government is the one participating in the international arena. 
The physical base of the state, as mentioned above, consists of the population, 
territory, natural and human-made resources. All the states, due to the similarity of their physical 
base, have same security threats, despite the difference in the level of their development, size of 
territory etc. A state with a long history usually has attachment to the territory. Territory can be 
endangered by the external factors, i.e. other states or by internal factors, such as secessionist 
entities. Depending on the value of the territory, the losses of some part of the territory is not 
necessarily danger to the state. However, due to technical, economic and social developments, the 
territorial value might change. The threat to the territory is widely related to the threat to the 
population of the state.  
Another threat to the population can be caused by migration. The migration might 
have large economic effects, especially in the states with scarce resources, where the migrants from 
other parts or immigrants might be fighting over the resources. “It [immigration] can also work in 
the economic and environmental sectors if newcomers overburden a fragile environment or compete 
over the scarce resources” (Buzan, 1991: 93). Moreover, the large migration might in the long-run 
change the idea of the state. Because the state is based on the physical base, its protection is vital to 
the state security.  
Based on the above features, Buzan provides a typology of the states. He distinguishes 
between the weak states, strong states, weak powers and strong powers. The weak and strong states 
differ in their degree of socio-political cohesion. The weak state is the state with weak institutions 
and weak ideas. The weakness and the strength of the power are related to the military and 
economic capability of the country. A weak power can be a strong state and vice-versa.  
According to Buzan, one of the reasons for the weakness of the state stems from the 
decolonization, where new countries were created without taking into consideration the cultural and 
 21
ethnic borders. Most of these new states had no political foundation of their own and the newly 
emerged ones strongly resisted the western structures. There were created many states with multiple 
nations in it. “Thus the legacy, plus the existence of societies not well suited to the demands of 
complex economic and political relations, defined much of the problem of weak states in the Third 
World” (Buzan, 1991: 98). Moreover, these new states are relatively at the early stage of creating 
the state-nations, which is leaving them in a situation of high insecurity. Furthermore, the weak 
states are the states that fell short of proving the basic security internally, within their states.  
Further, Buzan provides the conditions which are distinctive to weak states (1991: 100):    
 
1. “High level of political violence; 
2. A conspicuous role of political police in the everyday lives of citizens; 
3. Major political conflict over what ideology will be used to organize the state; 
4. Lack of coherent national identity, or a presence of contending national identities within the 
state; 
5. Lack of clear and observed hierarchy of political authority; 
6. A high degree of state control over the media.”  
 
As mentioned above the weak states do not have a widely accepted idea and the government of 
these states have failed to function due to absence of political consensus, so it is only the physical 
base of the state which can face the security threats. These states exist only because other states 
recognized them as states. In such states, there can be a high degree of domestic insecurity, where 
the militias and other groups largely contest the state, thus here the main threat to the security stems 
from within the state. For the strong state, on the other hand, the only security threat may come 
from external factors.  
Goran Hyden made a typology of the states (Figure 1) based on the definition of the 
weak and strong, firm and soft states (Hyden, 2006: 69). He defines the strong state as capable of 
shaping the society whereas the weak state is on the contrary is unable to control the society. In the 
firm state on the other hand, the officials are able to follow the official rules, legislations and laws. 
The soft state officials do not adhere to the formal rules. Moreover, the weakness of the states is 
related not only to the state capacity of exercising social control, but also to “how easy the state can 
be penetrated by groups in the society using informal means to acquire influence” (Hyden, 2006: 
69). Hyden further continues that the African states are weak as organizational instrument and also 
open to influence of political patrons who represent communities. Thus the African states encounter 
problems due to its weak and soft nature. “It is so deeply embedded in societal relations that remain 
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locally specific and inadequately integrated into an abstract system of rules that can be manipulated 
by officials, that state lacks the preconditions … associated with modern state… Most notably, 
society in Africa lacks organization and civil statistical information that makes the state’s 
development function legible” (Hyden, 2006: 69-70).  
 
 
 
These weak and soft natures of the African states are related to some specific and interrelated 
features of the African politics and society, which are described by Goran Hyden (Hyden, 2006). In 
the following we are going to outline some of these features, which are important to our research. 
One of them is related to the autonomy of state. The state is not fully autonomous in Africa, but it 
is largely dependent on the society. As mentioned above, the state is not able to control the society; 
it is rather the opposite process. The national resources are spent not on the national level and 
according to the political priorities but according to the rulers who use the resources for fulfilling 
the needs of specific community. Moreover, the tradition of prioritizing people to territory is 
strongly embedded in the state operation in Africa today. Traditionally, in the opinion the African 
rulers, successful ruling is to connect to the people and get more followers, rather than extending 
their territorial borders or establishing control over the territory. For the majority of the African 
rulers, the land issue was never as important as the people. This tradition has left deep traces in 
today’s political arena in the African continent and thus the control over the territory plays a 
secondary role (Hyden, 2006).  
Strong 
Firm 
Soft 
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Figure 1. State typology by World Region 
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Furthermore, the distinction between private and public is very vague. This is due to 
the blurredness of the border between the society and state. This vagueness means that the officials 
in Africa do not follow the official rules and rules of conduct and therefore the officials act due to 
their own accord, for their own benefit rather than for public benefit. This in turn results in the 
enormous corruption among the state officials and thus makes the public sector highly ineffective 
and inefficient.  
Besides that, the African state is governed not by policies but by patronage. This 
means that the government and its officials do not implement policies, but instead work on 
providing rewards to those who were more loyal. “To the extend that policies feature in politics, 
they are more often for window-dressing purposes than for real implementation” (Hyden, 2006: 
230). Moreover, the informal institutions in the African society prevails the formal institutions. 
This is due to the vagueness between the society and the state and due to patronage tradition. 
Although these informal institutions exist alongside the formal ones, they are much more powerful 
than the formal institutions and thus “it is their self-regulating logic rather than such principles as 
transparency and public accountability that determine the conduct of state agencies” (Hyden, 2006: 
230). This in turn negatively affects the formal institutions, which tend to demonstrate low 
performance in relation to their duties, due to the influence of the informal institutions. The African 
leaders support more concentration than separation of power. They believe that concentrating the 
power and resources is necessary for building of nation-state. The central power controls the 
functions of the other bodies (Hyden, 2006).  
It is also worth mentioning that most of the countries in the African continent, apart 
from few exceptions, did not have state in the pre-colonial era. The form of state which was brought 
by the western colonizers was something foreign to the Africans. Where the states in the Western 
Europe developed throughout centuries, the state-building process in Africa was an unnatural 
process, where foreign rules and norms were imposed to the Africans, and time period of this state-
building process was accelerated, which complicated the matters even more (Ayoob, 1995). In order 
to create a functioning state the “state-makers need two things above all – lots of time and a 
relatively free hand to persuade and coerce the disparate populations under their nominal rule to 
accept the legitimacy of the state boundaries and institutions, to accept the right of the state to 
extract resources from them, and to let the state regulate important aspects of their lives. 
“Unfortunately for Third World state elites, neither of these commodities is available in adequate 
measure” (Ayoob, 1995: 29). This process of state-building is also accelerated by the pressure from 
the international community, which, according to Ayoob, negatively affect the success of this 
process.  
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Besides that, the colonial rule has played a negative role in the development of state in 
the African countries. The colonial administrative units established by the colonizers were created 
without taking into consideration the specific cultural and ethnic components and thus the ethnic 
groups and cultures were literary cut from each other into different units. This has further led to a 
situation, where the same ethnic groups were divided between the different states, which, in return 
has created a fertile soil for secessionism.  
Apart from that, the colonial rule has changed the natural economic development of 
these countries. More than that, the colonizers used “traditional” structures of authority as a ruling 
instrument in the colonized countries. This has “aggravated the problems of creating a modern 
nation-state after independence. The different groups in the country maintained their separate ethnic 
identities by being ruled in part through their own native institutions, different sections of the 
population perceived each other as strangers, sometimes as aliens, increasingly as rivals, and 
ominously as potential enemies” (Mazrui quoted in Ayoob, 1995: 36). Usually these local 
authorities were consisting of authorities who failed to function. Furthermore, different ethnic 
solidarities were created determined by various factors, as migration, educational background, 
changes in production. This has sharpened the ethnic division and competing ethnic groups, which 
in return caused the secessionist movements.    
In addition, at the time of independence, many of the western colonizers left the 
continent without giving the Africans proper guidance on governing of their countries. “Although 
the colonial powers tried to modernize African society, they did not do enough of it. Furthermore, 
the heavy-handed and patronizing way in which they did so made Africans resist it” (Hyden, 2006: 
232). At the time of independence, the African leaders were left with no clear idea or knowledge on 
how the modern state should function, thus with the limited time in addition to this, it made the 
state making process very painful experience for many of the countries.    
3.4. Applicability of theories 
After presenting our theoretical framework, it is important to explain how we are going to apply 
these theories in our research. In order to conduct our analysis the theory of historical 
institutionalism, Europeanization approach and the concept of weak state developed by Buzan and 
Hyden and as are going to be used.  
Historical institutionalism approach was chosen by us in order to explain the evolution 
of development and security policies of the EU and thus arguing that European policies towards 
Africa were path dependent. Our main emphasis is that European policies towards Africa were path 
dependent both when the choices of policy instruments and the increase in aid volume are 
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concerned.  Furthermore, historical institutionalism will also allow us to analyse that the EU s 
policies and instruments launched towards Africa after 9/11 have nothing to do with war on terror, 
rather, they could be explained with reference to EU as a normative or civilian power. The lack of 
change in policy responses is going to be explained by applying the path dependency and the 
bureaucratic inertia.  
Europeanization approach is going to be applied in order to explain how EU is 
exporting its norms, values and “ways of doing things” outside its borders. The main emphasis is 
put on the outcomes of the Europeanization process in peace building area and the determinants of 
these outcomes. Thus, Europeanization approach will be used in order to explain how the domestic 
factors and EU’s policy coherence, consistence and clearness are playing a major role in explaining 
these outputs. The way we apply Europeanization approach is restricted in two ways. 
Europeanization approach is limited geographically to a country outside European zone and 
thematically it is restricted to the field of peace building process. Furthermore, this Europeanization 
approach is going to be complemented by the domestic factors which affect this peace building 
process. We are going to apply the typology of states provided by Buzan and Hyden, in order to 
understand what domestic factors play a role on the effectiveness of peace building process in DRC. 
This typology is going to be applied to the state in Congo and the domestic features will be 
analysed according to the characteristics of African state and society outlined by Hyden and Ayoob. 
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4. Empirical framework  
Our empirical framework is divided in two parts. In the first part we are going to present the EU’s 
policy towards Africa, with the main emphasis on development aid and security polices. In the 
second part we will present our empirical case, the Democratic Republic of Congo. Here we will 
highlight the political environment in Congo and the EU’s instruments towards this country.    
4.1. The EU policies towards Africa  
In this subsection we are going to present the Africa policy of the EU. Due to the fact that the EU’s 
Africa policy consists of two separate policy fields - development assistance and the CFSP - we are 
going to present the main initiatives launched within the area of security separately from the 
initiatives taken in the field of development assistance. This division is also important because the 
actors and the decision-making procedures differ from one policy field to another. However, the 
split between development aid policies and the common foreign and security policies is not without 
difficulties, mainly because these policies are becoming more and more interlinked.  
In order to have the complete picture of the EU’s policy towards Africa we will also 
have to emphasize briefly on the Union’s humanitarian assistance policy. For practical reasons the 
humanitarian assistance policy is going to be presented in the same section as the development aid 
instruments. However, we are aware that humanitarian aid differs both conceptually and empirically 
from development aid. Thus, development aid is defined by its aim, which is promotion of the 
economic development and welfare, while humanitarian aid is “defined by its short-term 
perspective and by its aim to relieve the consequences of the natural disasters and/ or civil strife and 
war” (Olsen, 2000: 4).  
We will present the European Community’s main policies towards Africa 
chronologically starting with the policies launched from the very beginning of the EC until toady.     
4.1.1. Development aid policies  
Since 1954 the Sub-Saharan Africa was considered to be one of the most important regions for the 
European Community among the developing areas in the world. The Treaty of Rome was 
establishing the relations between the Community and the African countries. In this context the 
Article 131 of Treaty of Rome stated that “The purpose of association shall be to promote the 
economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic 
relations between them and the Community as a whole (Treaty of Rome, 1957). The association 
relations established by the Treaty of Rome included two important elements: the establishment of 
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the free trade between the EC and African countries, and aid from the EC to the poor territories 
(Grilli, 1994).  
During the Cold War the only external policy of the EU towards Africa was mainly 
the development assistance delivered through the successive Lome Conventions. According to Hurt 
“the first Lome Convention represented something of a breakthrough for the ACP states” (Hurt in 
Taylor and Williams, 2004: 158). Lome I convention (1975-1980) was important for two main 
reasons. First, aid allocations were guaranteed for the 5 years. Secondly, the provisions of 
Convention provided for qualified non-reciprocal trade access for the ACP countries. In the late 
1990’s the European Commission described Lome as one of the most significant facets of the 
European Union’s external activities. The most important characteristic of the original EC aid was 
that it was aimed to be politically and economically neutral (Olsen, 2002).  
Immediately after the end of the Cold War, Lome Convention underwent considerable 
changes. The main change was that the financial assistance was cut down. This was done in 1995 in 
connection with the mid-term review and in 1999 during the negotiations of the Lome V. Lome’s 
relative share of total EU development aid went down from 66,3% in 1989/90 to 42,8% in 1996/97 
(Olsen, 2000: 4). Another change just as important as the former was the inclusion of a great 
number of conditionalities such as structural adjustment, adherence to democracy, human rights, 
rule of law, transparency and good governance. The policies, which came out afterwards, were 
confirming that the democracy and human rights would be preconditions for receiving aid from 
Europe. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty established that “Community policy in this area shall 
contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, 
and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Treaty of Maastricht, 1992, 
Article 130u, Section 2). In this context Lister suggests that the shift in the political nature of the 
development activities took place because of the following reasons. “There has been a shift in focus 
towards Eastern European since the end of the Cold War. Second, there has been a broadening of 
the external interests of the EU in general. Third, the external interests of the EU in Africa have 
dwindled in response to the continents poor economic performance during the 1980” (Lister quoted 
by Hurt in Taylor and Williams, 2004: 158). 
After the expiry of the Lome Convention in February 2000 the relations between EU 
and ACP countries were governed by the new ACP-EC agreement signed on the 23rd of June in 
Cotonou. The Cotonou Agreement addresses the shortcomings of the previous agreements by 
reinforcing the political dimension of the ACP-EU partnership. In this context it is stated in the 
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agreement that “The partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventually 
eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual 
integration of the ACP countries into the world economy” (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Article 1). 
The real innovation of the Cotonou Agreement is the introduction of the political dialogue between 
the EU and the ACP. Thus, in Article 8 of the Agreement it is mentioned “The Parties shall 
regularly engage in a comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue leading to commitments 
on both sides” and through this political dialogue “the Parties shall contribute to peace, security and 
stability and promote a stable and democratic political environment” (Cotonou Agreement, 2000). 
In the evolution of EU’s development instrument towards Africa it is significant to 
mention about the EU decisions that were taken at the UN Millennium summit in September 2000. 
The EU countries promised to raise their development aid in order to assure the reaching of the 
Millennium Development Goals. Upwards the EU countries agreed to reach 0,51% of individual 
GNI in development aid by 2010 and 0,7 by 2015. It was decided that 50% of the agreed increase 
should be distributed to African continent (Council 16-17 June 2005: 8-9). The increase in the EU 
development aid to Sub-Saharan Africa means that the region is getting an increased share of the 
total net disbursements of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the EU as it almost 
reached 37% in 2005 compared with 30,4% in 2001 (OECD 2006: table 29 in Olsen, 2008: 12). 
Important changes took also place in the geographical distribution of the development aid from the 
EU to particular African countries. In this context it is worth mentioning that from 2001 until 2005 
several countries experienced increases in their aid volume, while others experienced the opposite.4 
From an institutional perspective it is important to mention that in the field of the 
development policies it is the Commission with its specialized aid administration, EuropeAid that 
holds the executive power. Additionally, the Commission has an important independent influence 
over input as well as over policy outcomes within the field of development aid (Hix and Holland in 
Olsen, 2008: 5). 
In the EU’s policy landscape the humanitarian assistance is a highly important 
instrument in supporting ESDP/ CFSP initiatives concerning the enhancement of security stability 
in the crisis regions. This policy instrument was has to some extent buttressed the aim of giving 
priority to conflict management and conflict prevention in Africa. The EC office responsible for 
humanitarian assistance is ECHO. The organization was established after the end of the Cold War 
                                                 
4 The EU cut its aid to Ivory Coast by no less than 77%, Kenya- 41%, Eritrea- 64%, Ethiopia17%. On the other hand the 
DRC had an increase with no less than 309%, Mozambique-72%, Sudan –118%,Nigeria 57% (Europeaid / European 
Commission ,2005) 
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and its existence was determined especially by EU’s failure to deliver effective humanitarian 
assistance during and after the crisis following the war liberating Kuwait in 1991. Humanitarian 
assistance mechanisms are complicated as this kind of aid comes from no less than three sources: 
first some assistance is financed through ECHO, secondly some assistance is also financed through 
so-called ‘other Commission’, which means different General Directorates such as DG I and DG 
VIII, thirdly humanitarian assistance is also disbursed bilaterally by the member states.  
In regards to Africa it is important to mention that resources from ECHO, ‘other 
Commission’ and bilateral donations made Europe the biggest provider of humanitarian assistance 
during the 1990’s. In this context in ECHO Annual review (1999) it is mentioned that the combined 
resources of these institutions were accounting for 53% of global humanitarian assistance, while 
ECHO as a separate donor accounted   for around one-third of the amount situating it among the top 
global donors of humanitarian aid (ECHO, 1999: 29). 
From 2001 until 2006, on the average of 37% of the all humanitarian assistance from 
the EU went to Africa (ECHO, 2002). In 2006 ACP countries received 48% of the all EU 
humanitarian aid, while in 2007 ACP countries received 55% of ECHO total final budget (DG for 
Humanitarian aid -ECHO Financial report, 2007: 7).    
4.1.2. The EU’s foreign and security policy towards Africa  
After the end of the Cold War the issues of the conflicts in Africa has gained particular significance 
in the overall policy towards Africa. Particularly the genocide in Rwanda was a very frustrating 
experience for the EU and constituted an additional push for the EU to take particular measures in 
order to support African capacities for conflict prevention and resolution. These changes happened 
at a time when the EU was trying to increase its political and security role in the world. It was the 
period when the EU was developing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Faria, 2004: 
31).  
It is important to mention that since 1995 the issues on conflict prevention and 
resolution have been addressed often by the European Council and Commission. Thus, in 1996 the 
Commission launched its first communication on this subject, stating that the use of development 
aid and related instruments were considered to be important for the EU (Olsen, 2002: 19). One 
essential action towards involvement in conflict prevention in Africa came in March 1996 when the 
EU Council of the Ministers agreed to appoint a Special Envoy with the aim “to help the countries 
in the region (i.e. the Great Lakes Region) to resolve the crisis affecting them” (Council 1996 in 
Olsen, 2008: 3). The real changes concerning the European attitudes towards crisis management 
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and conflict prevention issues took place in 1998 at the French-British summit in St. Malo. The St. 
Malo summit was of importance in two ways. First, one of the crucial decisions was concerning the 
open British support to the plans of establishing a so-called European defence dimension (Howorth, 
2007). Secondly, at this summit both France and Great Britain accepted that “time had come to end 
the contest for influence in Africa between the two old colonial powers” (Financial times, 10 March 
1999 quoted in Olsen, 2002: 19). After the St. Malo summit, the importance of the general foreign 
and security issues were explicitly articulated in 2000 by the Portuguese Presidency in its reflection 
paper. The paper mentioned “development priorities should be thought of in the context of ongoing 
dynamics namely those related to the reorganization of external relations and the building of a 
European CFSP. Being realistic about development means thinking in an integrated manner about 
politics, security and trade as well as development aid itself” (Cardoso in Olsen, 2008: 4). The next 
step in the EU-Africa relations was made at European-African summit in Cairo in 2000. In the 
Cairo Declaration it is stressed that the two parties are committed “to give a new strategic 
dimension to the global partnership between Africa and Europe” (Cairo Declaration, 2000: 2). 
Furthermore, it is stressed “Peace, security, stability and justice are essential prerequisites for socio-
economic development” (Cairo Declaration, 2000: 9). The Cairo Summit and the EU efforts to 
formulate a coherent policy towards Africa were followed up in December 2005 by the adoption of 
the “EU Strategy for Africa”.  
Also of importance in the context of security issues is the Article from the Cotonou 
Agreement (2000) which clearly refers to the peace building polices, conflict prevention and 
resolution. Thus Article 11 stresses that “The Parties shall pursue an active, comprehensive and 
integrated policy of peace building and conflict prevention and resolution within the framework of 
the Partnership. This policy shall be based on the principle of ownership. It shall in particular focus 
on building regional, sub-regional and national capacities, and on preventing violent conflicts at an 
early stage by addressing their root-causes in a targeted manner, and with an adequate combination 
of all available instruments” (Cotonou Agreement, 2000). Following the Cotonou agreement, in 
May 2001, the Council adopted a “Common position concerning conflict prevention, management 
and resolution in Africa”. The common position is relevant mainly because it is a CFSP instrument 
and it also complements the development focus of the Communication on the EU-Africa dialogue, 
which was issued in June 2003 (ECDPM, 2006: 23).  
Following the events of the 9/11 the European Council produced several declarations 
concerning terrorism. The most important statements were “The Conclusion and the plan of action 
of the extraordinary European Council meeting on 21 September” (European Council, 2001). The 
issues concerning terrorism remained on the agenda of the EU-Africa relation and were addresses 
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on the background of the traditional topics, such as peace and security, governance, trade, food 
security etc. The broader security debate became formalized in 2003, when European Security 
Strategy (ESS) was adopted. The special key threats mentioned in the Strategy are: terrorism, 
proliferations of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime 
(ESS, 2003). Terrorism followed by the weapons of mass destruction are placed as the main threats. 
Concerning the regional conflicts the ESS stresses that “conflicts can lead to extremism, terrorism 
and state failure; it provides opportunities for organized crime” (ESS, 2003: 4). In regard to failed 
states the ESS stresses that “collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats such as 
organized crimes or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines the global 
governance and adds to regional instability” (ESS, 2003: 4). As referred to organized crime the ESS 
underlines that “Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states” (ESS, 
2003: 4). The ESS generally established a link between the new security threats and 
underdevelopment, which has particularly implication when the EU polices towards Africa are 
concerned. Thus, the ESS clearly mentions, “Security is a precondition for development” (ESS, 
2003: 2). It is also stated that “The challenge now is to bring the together the different instruments 
and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military 
and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact 
on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development” (ESS, 
2003: 13). 
The interplay of different areas of the EU external relation was also reflected in the 
Africa Strategy launched in 2005. Thus the Strategy stresses that “Without peace, there can be no 
lasting development” (Africa Strategy, 2005: 10). Furthermore it is mentioned that “Peace and 
security are therefore the first essentials prerequisites for sustainable development” (Africa 
Strategy, 2005: 26). That’s why the EU steps up its efforts to promote peace and security at all 
stages of the conflict cycle (Africa Strategy, 2005). Therefore the EU has “set up a more 
comprehensive EU approach complementing these Community instruments through CFSP/ESDP 
approaches. A common EU policy is therefore needed…” (African Strategy, 2005: 71).  
In order to get the whole picture of the EU policy towards Africa it is also important 
to mention the EU’s security initiatives towards Africa. In this context it is important to mention the 
EU’s Artemis Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo, mainly because it was the first ESDP 
operation in Africa and it was first independent military mission ever, without support from NATO, 
under the Berlin Plus Agreement (Ulriksen et al, 2004). Other instruments that EU launched 
towards DRC will be subject of the next section.  
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On the EU security issues landscape it is also important to mention the EU instrument 
– Peace Facility for Africa. This was the result of the General Affairs Council agreement on a draft 
to use the European Developing Fund to create the Peace Facility for Africa as a response to the 
request made by the African Union (Faria, 2004: 36). African Peace Facility, which was a 250 
million Euro instrument, financed by the EDF (development money) was launched with the aim to 
support African peacekeeping operations (Olsen, 2008: 10). Thus, the Peace facility had sustained 
the African mission in Darfur (Sudan) and so financed the mission with more than 242 million 
Euros. Furthermore, the Peace facility instrument is in line with another instrument launched by the 
EU on 26th January 2004- “Common position on conflict prevention, management and resolution in 
Africa”. The common position is a direct continuation of the polices launched in the latter half of 
the 1990’s and it mainly emphasised on how to empower African states and regional organization to 
deal with crisis and conflict themselves (Biscop, 2005).  
Summing up, the Africa Policy of the EU consist of two separate policy fields with 
different actors participating in policy making. Within the CFSP field the Council Secretariat 
together with the individual member states’ governments make the Africa Policy of the Union. 
While in the case of the development assistance it is the Commission, which has the main role both 
in policy making and in policy implementation.  
4.2. Democratic Republic of Congo 
In this section we will briefly present the historical outlines and political background of the DRC 
and the situation today.  
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC/ Congo) is a vast country situated in the heart of 
Africa. DRC, a former Belgian colony, is rich in natural resources and is a home for over 62.6 
million of inhabitants5 and 200 ethnic groups. DRC occupies the 168th place out of 177 on the list of 
human development index6. The country is considered to be a post conflict state in transition, which 
is in need for political, judicial, legal reforms as well as reforms in the security area.  
4.2.1. History of the DR Congo 
This section provides a brief overview of the Congolese history starting from the exploitation of the 
country by the Belgium. The contemporary Congolese situation is “a direct result of crosscutting 
influences in its particular history” (McCalpin, 2002: 33), thus we find it necessary to provide the 
reader with a brief outline of this historical development in the country.  
                                                 
5 UN 2007 – extracted from www.bbc.com – 11.03.2008 
6 Extracted from website: http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/countries/congo_kinshasa.htm 
- 11.03.2008 
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After the Conference of Berlin in 1884-1885, which has established the Congo as a 
personal possession of the Belgian King Leopold (with the main purpose of exploitation of the 
natural resources), the country was renamed to “Congo Free State”, and a number of territories was 
forcefully incorporated into it. In 1908 the Congo has become the official colony of Belgium, rather 
than the personal property of one person. During these times, the Congo was divided into territorial 
units, without regards to the ethnic relations and internal borders, which has “destroyed the native 
polities, but not the ethnopolitical identity in which they were based” (McCalpin, 2002: 35). 
Moreover, the natives were excluded from the trade, due to King Leopold’s policies. In the 
meanwhile, the tensions between the ethnic groups were getting high due to scarce resources and 
difficulties of access to the state. The native rules were largely undermined and excluded from the 
administration of the country. In the period of 1887-1905, the population of Congo was halved due 
to brutality of the Belgian administration, famine and epidemics (McCalpin, 2002). Although King 
Leopold, after the pressure from other European states, has launched a series of social reforms, 
these have never been realized.  
In the beginning of the last part of 20th century, Congolese political movements and 
parties emerged, which required equal treatment and political participation. However, these 
movements were not operating on the national level, instead they represented ethnic groups. The 
political rhetoric from France on the independence of the francophone colonies and the riot in the 
capital city of Congo have been one of the main events that have pawed the road to independence. 
Although the independence was inevitable for Congo, the Belgian officials did not develop 
particular plans for giving them the independence. Neither Belgium, not the Congo was prepared 
for the independence at that time. However, in 1960 the national elections took place followed by 
the independence of Congo and the constitution was approved by Belgium. After the founding 
Congolese elections in 1960, the Mouvement National Congolaise with P. Lumumba as leader has 
acquired the majority of the seats in the Assembly. This party in coalition with Abako (Kasavubu as 
leader) have formed a government. Kasavubu became the president and Lumumba the prime 
minister. This coalition, however, was very weak as they had many disagreements as to how to rule 
the newly emerged state.  
Apart from the administrative structure inherited from the colonial times, the 
independent Congo suffered from the lack of political culture and ethnic rivalries. The 
independence was followed by violent conflicts and problems on the economic issues, due to the 
fact that there was no economic middle class of Congolese. Because the violence was in some cases 
directed towards the remaining Belgian population, Belgium has sent its troops to protect their 
citizens, which was seen by the Congolese as invasion of their territory. As a response to this, the 
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Congolese authorities asked for support from the international community, namely the UN, which 
in return caused the involvement of external actors, as USSR, USA, UN, beside Belgium. 
Alongside these developments, a southern province of Congo has seceded for the following few 
years. This secession is seen as a “part of Belgian’s plan to preserve its capital investments in a 
Congo headed by a staunch anti-imperialist leader” (McCalpin, 2002: 39). When the UN did not 
succeed to resolve the situation in favour of Congo, Lumumba sought help from the USSR, which 
in return caused to his dismissal by the president. The country was facing political instability and 
chaos for some years during the post-colonial period and Mobutu conducted a peaceful coup. 
Lumumba was arrested few times and assassinated in 1961 with the approval of some western 
governments. It is not clear as to the character of this support, but “it was the fulfilment of 
Belgium’s and America’s desire to eliminate a perceived threat to the stability and anticommunist 
ideal” (McCalpin, 2002: 39). The country’s political situation went even further to chaotic 
conditions. Congo was largely defragmented, and it even had two capital cities. For the following 
decades, the Congo existed in the chaotic conditions under the kleptocratic rule of Mobutu, which 
has left the country politically instable and economically devastated.  
The country still suffers from the legacy of the 32 years of dictatorship of president 
Mobutu Sese Seko (in the period of 1965-1997) who enjoyed his absolute power over the country’s 
legislative, judiciary and executive branches of the state. He had a right to change the constitution at 
his own accord and banned political parties. The incorrect economic decisions and widespread 
corruption have left the country in an extremely hard position with a huge foreign debt of $14 
billion US dollars (International Crisis Group Africa Report N°114, 2006: 3). The next president, 
Laurent Kabila, who has overthrown Mobutu in 1997, did not differ from his predecessor in many 
ways. He has also banned political parties and dissolved the parliament. He did not change the 
constitution of the country and had a presidential monopoly over the legislature. Moreover, huge 
spending on the military and wrong economic activities have not improved the economic situation 
in the country. There was no state budget in the period between 1998 and 2001 and by 2000 the 
inflation has reached 511 % (International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°114, 2006: 3). The 
pressure from the international financial institutions to investigate the massacres of the previous 
wars has led to suspension of cooperation between DRC (then Zaire) and these financial 
institutions.  
After the assassination of Laurent Kabila in 2001, his son, Joseph Kabila took over the 
presidency of the country. This change meant more positive developments in the country, with more 
economic growth due to positive monetary and fiscal policies and a considerable increase in foreign 
aid. Since 2002 the president had 4 prime ministers, and a bicameral parliament was established. A 
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transitional constitution was drafted, which has ensured the separation of powers, court 
independence and guaranteed basic civil rights. In February 2006, the new constitution entered into 
force, where the president must share the power with a prime minister elected from the majority 
party (International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°114, 2006).  
4.2.2. Political situation today  
Although the picture of DRC is much more positive today than for few years ago, there are still lots 
of problems that the state of DRC faces. As mentioned previously, the DRC state is in a transitional 
phase and the lack of training and resources as well as fragile parliament and auditing bodies are 
contributing to the weakness of the state (International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°114, 2006).  
Widespread corruption, abuse of power position, high level of nepotism in the state 
apparatus, phenomenon of “ghost workers”, graft and embezzlement are some of the major causes 
weakening the state. The corruption and abuse of power are negatively affecting the collection of 
the revenues. There are no clear rules on the government spending, so that the civil servants 
regularly overspend their budget. Moreover, graft in the state system, which leads to considerable 
differences in the salaries of civil servants, ranging from 50 $ for an ordinary civil servant and till 
4000 $ for a minister, create a fertile ground for increased bribery and corruption. The military 
sector is no exception to this. High level of embezzlement is a widespread phenomenon in the 
country’s military. Often the high ranking officers overtake the resources, which were meant for the 
soldiers and staff, and this in result leaves the soldiers in miserable positions, which makes them 
harass the local population. Despite the existence of special controlling and monitoring bodies, with 
a purpose of monitoring the spending of the resources, these are highly ineffective and corrupt 
themselves (International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°114, 2006). 
As mentioned above, the bicameral parliament, consisting of national assembly (with 
500 members) and a senate (with 120 senators) were established. In addition, a permanent 
commissions to draft and revise the laws, and ad hoc commissions were found. The parliament 
activities are largely financed from the international donations. The parliament members are often 
disengaged and uninterested in the issues of drafting laws and overseeing the executives. In 
addition, the constitution of the 2006 and the electoral law have undermined the role of the 
parliament. The laws have given the president the right to dissemble the national assembly in the 
case of serious crisis situation, which has undermined the possibility of the parliament to sanction 
the government. The proportional voting system has challenged the smaller parties and diminished 
the position of the opposition. “Political parties are also relatively weak. In a context of weak party 
discipline, in which parliamentarians often change allegiance, the absence of list voting will 
legitimise strongmen at the expense of parties and create opportunities for “buying out” legislators 
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after elections” (International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°108, 2006: 22). Moreover, the 
opposition is being highly fragmented with around 300 small political parties, which is not 
facilitating the democratization process (International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°108, 2006). The 
laws have not provided minimum level of education of parliamentarians, although providing 
minimum age. Besides that, the president is given the power of residing over the Council of 
Ministers. Moreover, the ethnicity is an important factor for parliamentary voting among the 
population, which makes people vote on the ethnic preferences rather than for political parties 
(International Crisis Group, Africa Report no 108, 2006). “Furthermore, the current electoral law 
does not provide for adequate representation of women and minorities in politics” (International 
Crisis Group, Africa Report N°108, 2006: 22). 
The court system is also very weak and fails to function properly due to the political 
interference and lack of resources. Although the new constitution guarantees the independence of 
the judges, the politicians are still involved in the judicial affairs. In addition to this, the weak police 
force makes it extremely difficult to establish order in the country (International Crisis Group, 
Africa Report N°108, 2006). The DRC police force has never been very effective and they 
themselves are one of the main abusers of human rights. Since the colonial times, the police have 
always lacked appropriate training, management and resources (International Crisis Group, Africa 
Report N°108, 2006).  
4.2.3. The conflict background in the DRC 
This chapter will provide with a brief overview on the conflict in the DRC. The Congo war, which 
is best described as ‘Central African web of wars’, had begun in 1998 (Ulriksen et al, 2004: 510). It 
had involved nine governments and numerous rebellious guerrilla movements. Nearly 3.5 million 
people missed lives since 1998 due to direct and indirect results of the war and thousands of 
Congolese were displaced (Faria, 2004). Today estimated 1000 people die everyday due to direct or 
indirect cause of the conflict, mainly malnutrition, disease and violence as well (International Crisis 
Group, 2006).  
The root causes of the conflict have external and internal character. Tensions between 
the ethnical groups, struggle over power and the natural resources on the one hand and the 
economic interests and political ambitions of the neighbouring countries on the other have 
contributed to the conflict. The conflict firstly originated in the eastern part of Congo due to the 
citizenship rights problems of an ethnic group (Banyamulenge) stemming from the influx of Tutsi 
immigrants from Rwanda after the events of 1994. In 1997, Mobutu was overthrown by a coup led 
by Laurent Kabila, who was supported by Rwanda and Uganda, after which Kabila has come to 
power. However, the Banyamulenge ethnics were still unsatisfied with the rule of Kabila. In 1998 
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though, he has pushed the Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw their troops from the country, which 
led to dissatisfaction from the side of Rwanda, which has invaded the country, supported by the 
Congolese Tutsi rebels. In this fight Congo was getting assistance from Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Namibia. The Congolese territory became a battlefield between these conflicting parties. 
Despite the signing of the Lusaka agreement on ceasefire between the parties of the 
conflict in 1999 and the establishment of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (MONUC)7, the violence continued to occur. In 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated and 
replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila (International Crisis Group, 2006). Regardless of the peace 
accord signed in 2002 in Pretoria, followed by the establishment of the transitional government with 
J. Kabila on the power, the violence continued to occur and escalated in the eastern parts of the 
country, especially in the district of Ituri.  
Ituri region, situated in the eastern part of the country are in possession of immense 
natural resources and vast fertile lands. The district consists of 5 territories and has around 5 million 
inhabitants. Historically Ituri district has known clashes between the two ethnic groups, Hema and 
Lendu, which reside in the territory Djugu, which is one of the most fertile and rich territories of the 
country. The hatred between the groups is originated in Belgian colonial rule, where the pastoralist 
Hema population were more favoured by the colonisers. The Hemas were provided with education 
and later were appointed to the administrative positions in order to govern and supervise the Lendu 
workers. After the decolonization, the Hemas increasingly occupied the higher position in the 
society, which left the Lendus more marginalized and disadvantaged. Territorial conflicts between 
these two groups occurred frequently (International Crisis Group, Africa report N°64, 2003). 
However, due to the latest violent events, these clashes were expanded to almost all the 
communities of the region over the natural resources, power and control. The situation was 
worsened by the governments of Uganda, Rwanda and DRC government in Kinshasa who sent their 
troops to the region. Moreover, “the continuous flow of small arms into the area, the existence of 
many rival militias and their increasing fragmentation, and a continuous shift of allegiances has 
made Ituri one of the most volatile, unpredictable and insecure areas in DRC” (Faria, 2004: 39). 
Rwanda and Uganda respectively in 2002 and 2003 have withdrawn their troops out 
of DRC under a pressure from the international community. The Ituri Pacification Commission 
(IPC) was established in April 2003 under the supervision of MONUC Mission. Moreover, the 
Interim Ituri Administration was elected. After the withdrawal of Ugandan troops the violence 
between the two ethnic groups, Hema and Lendu, has escalated to the scale of genocide and ethnic 
                                                 
7 The mission was established in 1999 in order to facilitate the implementation of the Lusaka Accord – a ceasefire 
agreement between the leaders of the DRC, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Rwanda and Uganda. 
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cleansing and the MONUC which had a mandate of supporting the IPC failed to do so. The 
MONUC was targeted itself and thus the mission couldn’t even protect their own staff from 
violence (Faria, 2004). These violent events led to a humanitarian catastrophe with around 50000 
people killed and over a half a million civilians displaced in the Ituri region.     
In May 2003, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, has appealed to all the member 
states to form coalitions in order to stop the humanitarian disaster in the region of Ituri.  
4.3. Operation Artemis in Bunia and security policies of the EU in DRC 
France was the first country to respond to the appeal of the Secretary General to stop the violence in 
Ituri district. It has agreed to deploy troops into the region, however on certain conditions. The 
conditions that France has put forward were first of all that the UN chapter VII8 mandate was 
granted to it, that other countries would involve as well, that Uganda and Rwanda, involved in the 
conflict would support the French intervention and finally that the operation will have time and 
location limits. On May 30th, the Security Council has approved a deployment of French led Interim 
Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to the administrative centre of Ituri district, Bunia 
(International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°64, 2003).  
The operation Artemis has begun in June 2003 when the EU deployed 2000 troops to 
the conflict area (1000 of which in Bunia) and terminated in September 2001. The objective of the 
operation was, according to the Resolution of the 1484 under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter was 
“to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the 
humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons 
in the camps in Bunia; and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian 
population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in town” (Resolution 1484 of 
the UN Security Council, 30 May 2003, Article 1). The operation was conducted by France as a 
framework nation, with contribution from other EU and non-EU states. The troops mainly consisted 
of French alongside with the Swedish and UK forces, and other countries contributed with technical 
and other professional staff as well as technical and assistance in military and communication 
equipment. Moreover, reserve consisting of 1000 French troops was deployed to neighbouring 
countries to DRC (Faria, 2004).  
According to the EU authorities, the Operation Artemis was a successful operation 
which has had a considerable impact on the security in Bunia. Estimated 200000 refugees were able 
to return to their homes in the city and the economic life has been normalized. Moreover, better 
security conditions established after the operation restored the humanitarian and other assistance in 
                                                 
8 Chapter VII of UN Charter “Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression” 
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the region and the Interim Ituri Administration and Ituri Assembly got the possibility to conduct its 
activities again. As a result of improved security the MONUC mission was also able to restore its 
activities (Faria, 2004).  
Nevertheless, despite the short-term positive outcomes of the Operation Artemis, it 
had also its deficiencies. For instance, the operation has been successful in establishing immediate 
peace in Bunia by weakening the militias and other militant groups. However, this did not mean that 
these militant groups disappeared. These groups continued to exist and spread the violence. Besides 
that “demilitarization of Bunia did not really take place or was not fully accomplished” (Faria, 
2004:44). This is due to the limited time the operation was given, where Bunia was not made to a 
fully weapon-free zone. Moreover, the territorial limit of the operation has determined the violence 
only in Bunia and not outside it. Thus the violence still occurred in the other areas of the country.   
Another military mission, EUFOR RD Congo was launched in cooperation with the 
UN in 2006 during the elections in the DR Congo. This mission with the financing of 60 million 
euros has a mandate set up by the UN Security Council Resolution 1671, which aimed at supporting 
the MONUC mission in the DR Congo. Moreover, within the EUFOR mandate there is a protection 
of the civilians in the case of violence, protection of airport in Kinshasa among other things 
(Background DRC Elections 2006, EU support to the DRC during the election process9).  
Besides the operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo, the EU has launched a civilian 
mission EUPOL on the basis of the Joint Action adopted by the Council in December 2004 within 
the framework of the ESDP. This mission was set up within the Security Sector Reform mission 
and with more than total 17 million of euros financed from the Council, Commission and the 
member states of the EU. The mission is aimed at civilian crisis management. In 2005 the EU has 
launched an advisory mission for security reforms, with aim of providing assistance to the local 
security bodies. The purpose of this mission is also to ensure that the security policies are not in 
breach of human rights, rule of law and good governance. Moreover, in order to support the 
peaceful election process in 2006, the EU has launched a military operation in Kinshasa. This 
EUPOL operation was intended to support the MONUC mission in securing the peaceful election 
process, protecting civilians and the airport in Kinshasa (Olsen, 2008). Furthermore, the EUPOL is 
assisting the Congolese government in Integrated Police Unit programme, which has the aim of 
assisting the Congolese police in increasing their efficiency and professionalism. 
EUSEC RD Congo is a mission that the EU has launched in June 2005 following the 
request from the Congolese government. This mission is also within the Security Sector Reform 
mission and is aimed at making a security reform in the country by providing assistance and advice 
                                                 
9 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/90508.pdf - 31.03.2008 
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in relation to security matters to the Congolese authorities. Ensuring that the principles of 
democracy, human rights, rule of law are ensured in the policies is one of the other missions of the 
EUSEC10.  
Moreover, in order to assist the DRC during its election process, the EU has deployed 
around 300 observers within the Election Observation Mission in 2006. This mission was set up in 
order to ensure secure and stable election process in the country. The mission had a total financing 
of 9.4 million euros from the Commission’s EIDHR (European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human rights) budget. 
The three main missions, EUPOL, EUSEC and EUFOR are set up in close 
cooperation with the UN and have a purpose of supporting the MONUC mission of the UN.   
4.4. The EU development assistance to DRC  
After 10 years of suspension of cooperation between the DRC and the EU Commission, it was 
resumed on 5th December 2002. The Commission and the DRC government have signed a National 
Indicative Programme (NIP) titled “Programme de Rehabilitation et d'Appui au Processus de 
Paixet de Reconciliation” (RAPPER) with the aim of promoting democracy, good governance and 
rule of law in the country. Despite the cooperation suspension between 1992 and 2002, the EU has 
been providing aid of 40-50 million euros per year for the humanitarian aid, health, infrastructural 
and urban development through offices of ECHO established in the eastern part of the DRC, 
different NGO’s, Red Cross and UN agencies (Kobia, 2002; Hoebeke et al, 2007).  
Under the National Indicative Programme the EU Commission has approved a fund of 
120 million euros from the 8th European Development Fund (EDF) for poverty alleviation, transport 
management, health, urban development and water supply, institutional and administrative support. 
In addition to these 120 millions, a fund of additional 130 millions of euros was dedicated to 
support of global NIP strategy, consisting of 2 groups, which were aimed at supporting some of the 
main areas of NIP (for instance, poverty alleviation with emphasis on refugees, humanitarian aid, 
food safety, and administrative support with focus on democracy, human rights, rule of law, justice, 
disarmament, facilitation of inter-Congolese dialogue, Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)). 
Moreover, in 1999 the EU has financed the Lusaka ceasefire agreement (Kobia, 2002).  
Other longer term policies of the EU towards DRC were in the framework of the 
Cotonou agreement, among others, which aimed at providing of development aid, empowerment of 
the country’s economic and trading abilities in the world market and strengthening of the political 
dialogue with the aim of conflict prevention.  
                                                 
10 http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=909&lang=en&mode=g – 31.03.2008 
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On 2nd of September 2003, under the 9th EDF the EU has signed a 5-years cooperation 
programme with DRC on the sum of 205 million euros. This programme was aimed at creating a 
long-term stability in the country through reconstruction activities and improvement of the social 
and political conditions. The majority of the funds are dedicated to the Envelope A, which are the 
activities directed towards health sector, institutional support to democratization and establishment 
of rule of law and macro-economic assistance. The Envelop B with the sum of 34 million euros is 
directed towards activities of supporting Ituri district and aimed at civil administration, 
strengthening of the Ituri Interim Administration, rehabilitation activities, strengthening of rule of 
law and human rights. Moreover, the EU is supporting disarmament activities in the country (Faria, 
2004). In 2004, after the mid-term evaluation it was decided to provide additional 200 million of 
Euros to the Envelope A fund and 70 million euros for Envelope B11. Besides that, within the 
framework of supporting the justice and rule of law in DRC, the program of support of justice PAJ 
(Le Programme d’appui à la justice) was implemented in the period of 2002-2006. This program 
was aimed at creating rule of law and justice in DRC by normalizing the functioning of the judicial 
apparatus, through physical rehabilitation (buildings, equipment), instrumental rehabilitation 
(publication and distribution of laws and regulations) and distribution of information to public 
(Dessallien et al, 2007). Since 2006 the EU is contributing with amount of 7.9 million Euros to the 
REJUSCO programme, which has narrower scale than PAJ and has the aim of contributing to the 
capacity building of the judiciary in the Eastern provinces of the country by assisting the 
reinforcement of the functional capacity of the judicial in the Eastern provinces, contributing to the 
functioning of justice and confidence building among the local population in the judicial in the 
same area (Dessallien et al, 2007). Besides that, the EU is contributing the amount of 9 million 
euros to the justice reform at the central level from 2006.  
                                                 
11 http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/countries/congo_kinshasa.htm - 17-03-2008 
 42
5.  Analysis 
In this chapter we present our analysis. The analysis is made in three analytical steps: the evolution 
of the development and security policies of the EU towards Africa through historical 
institutionalism, the impacts of the EU security and development policies in DRC’s peace building 
process, followed by the EU factors that influence this peace building process and finally the DRC 
domestic factors, which have played role in this process.   
5.1. The development of the EU policies through Historical 
Institutionalism  
In this section we are going to make an analysis of the evolution of the EU’s policy towards Africa. 
In spite of general considerations that September 11 is in historical institutionalism terms a critical 
juncture, which can be applied to explain policy changes (Hall and Taylor in Olsen, 2008: 2), we 
want to argue in this section that the current Africa policies of the EU are mainly a continuation of 
policies that were already settled prior to the September 11. Thus in spite of the fact that September 
11 is a critical juncture, the EU policies launched after 2001 are structured and restrained by policy 
choices and institutional preferences established prior this date. Accordingly the Africa policy of the 
EU is path dependent even when the increase of the development assistance is taken into 
considerations. Furthermore the Africa policy of the EU is path dependent even when the link 
between security and development is concerned. We are also arguing that the main critical juncture 
in EU’s evolution of the Africa policy is rather the events of 1994 when the genocide in Rwanda 
took place. Rwanda genocide exercised a pressure on Europe on how to establish effective 
instruments in order to prevent such tragedies.   
The analysis of the Africa policy is based on three assumptions. The first is that the 
Africa policy of the EU can be examined by applying one theoretical approach and this is historical 
institutionalism. Thus, this assumption gives the EU Africa policy as Hill argues “a clear inclination 
towards continuity rather than change” (cited in Olsen, 2008: 3). The second assumption is based on 
the general idea that EU instruments towards Africa launched after September 11 has nothing to do 
with the war on terror but were rather determined by the traditional development goal such as 
poverty reduction combined with crisis management, which have been important elements of the 
Africa policy since the mid-1990’s. The third assumption in this analysis refers to the idea that 
generally development and security policies can be both complementary and oppositional. Thus, we 
will argue that in spite of the fact that security and development policy seem to be more and more 
linked this doesn’t make fundamental changes of existing policies and thus doesn’t lead to a policy 
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break. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that few in the EU would doubt that security and 
development go together, this link in practice is still contested (Youngs, 2007). 
When the first and the second assumptions are concerned the following issues needs 
to be taken into consideration in order to describe the development of the EU’s Africa policy: the 
path dependency and bureaucratic inertia. These two explanatory variables are important mainly 
because they seem to explain most of the lacking changes in the EU Africa policy and also can 
explain the policy choices.  
In regard to bureaucratic inertia, it is essential to recall the complexity of the EU 
institutional framework. Thus, as mentioned in the empirical part, due to the fact that the EU’s 
Africa policy consist of two separate fields – development assistance and the common foreign and 
security policy - the decision-making procedures and the actors involved differ from one policy 
field to the other. Thus the Commission has the executive power in the development aid field and 
“as a bureaucratic organization has a significant independent influence over policy input as well as 
over policy outcomes within this particular policy field” (Holland, 2002: 85). Commission’s 
particular preferences in the in the field of global politics in general are continuing to persist and in 
historical institutionalism terms exist in an equilibrium state, functioning in accordance with the 
decisions made at its initiation, or possibly those made at the previous point of punctuation (Peters, 
2005).  
Turning to the foreign policy of the EU here the Council Secretariat together with 27 
individual member governments make the Africa policy of the EU. Therefore because of this 
complex bureaucratic organization the EU institutions are facing great difficulties on changing or 
inventing new policy even when exposed to new and serious threats. 
When the second assumption is concerned, the EU policies launched after September 
2001 are characterized by continuity as the basic elements of these policies were laid down before 
terrorist attacks on USA. In this context it is important to reveal that is not only the crisis 
management interventions, which are path dependent, but also the development assistance policy of 
the EU. It is also important to state that the EU initiatives launched after 2001 have nothing to do 
with the global war on terror. These initiatives need to be examined as being influenced by 
traditional developments goal such as poverty eradication and crisis management, which were 
established as significant components of the Africa policy of the EU since the mid-1990. As 
emphasized in the empirical part the Commission and the Council launched instruments for conflict 
resolution in the 1990’s in the form of declarations and agreements. In this context it is important to 
recall St. Malo summit, which took place in 2000, Cairo declaration from 2000 that stressed, 
“Peace, security, stability and justice are essential prerequisites for socio-economic development” 
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(Cairo Declaration, 2000:  9). Instruments for the peace building, conflict prevention and resolution 
were also established within the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement. Thus, in spite of the fact that 
after 11 September the EU produced a lot of declarations and statements vis-à-vis international 
terrorism, when it comes to Africa the EU has limited its post September 11 policy to these 
declarations without significant changes in the policies and instruments choices. The issues of 
fighting terrorism remained on the EU-Africa agenda but mainly on the background of the 
traditional topics such as peace and security, governance, regional integration, eradication of 
poverty, issues which the EU put on the agenda before September 2001. However, it is important to 
underline that EU still considers terrorism as a serious threat as it is mentioned in the EU Security 
Strategy (European Council, 2003: 3). But it is also of importance to mention that EU’s Security 
Strategy established a link between the new security threats and underdevelopment or state failure 
and this is as Olsen argues “of particular importance in the case of EU polices towards sub-Saharan 
Africa” (Olsen, 2008: 6). 
One this background we need also to explain operation Artemis, which in spite of its 
novelties (the EU deployed for the first time a pure EU military force in a crisis management 
operation outside the Europe) “was a continuation of existing policies which increasingly put 
emphasis on conflict management and conflict prevention” (Olsen in Olsen, 2008:15). Furthermore, 
it is essential to underline that Operation Artemis has nothing to do with the global fight against 
terrorism, rather it should be understood as an instrument that reflects the internal EU priorities and 
preferences and is not an expression of particular European security concerns in Africa. Sustaining 
this interpretation the EU involvement in DRC was a manifestation of a choice policy, which was 
path dependent, and thus it was not the product of radically new policy priorities or the outcome of 
a critical juncture.  
The EU’s policies are also path dependent when development aid is concerned. It is 
clear that the EU increased, as we presented in the empirical part, its aid to Africa in the years 
following 2001. First of all, it is consistent to argue that the European decision-makers’ 
disbursement of aid to the African countries is “based mainly on criteria tied to the traditional aim 
of reducing poverty” (Olsen, 2008: 13). This type of argument is relevant not only for DRC case but 
also for other African countries such as Sudan, Zambia etc. On the other side, it is important to 
reveal that the EU reduced its aid to other African countries, which continued to lack the good 
governance in their countries. Examples of this are Ivory Coast (with its ongoing civil war), Kenya, 
Eritrea, etc. Thus, this shift in the geographical distribution confirms the argument that the 
allocation of the aid is based on the aim of reducing poverty and has nothing to do with the fight on 
terrorism. 
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Furthermore, there are indications that some of the aid increases “is even the result of 
disbursements of funds committed before 2001” (Olsen, 2008: 18). It is also significant to recall 
that the instruments and the decisions of the EU countries to increase their development aid towards 
Africa were taken in 2000 at the UN Millennium Summit, thus before 2001, and the increasing aid 
was decided in order to reach the ambitious Millennium Development Goals (MDG). In addition, 
the EU post September 11 development policies generally indicate, with the exception of the Africa 
Peace Facility, that the EU policies and instruments were path dependent and they also indicate the 
continued strong influence of values and norms on the EU foreign policies.  
Concerning the last assumption the following issues needs to be explained. As we 
stated in the empirical part the EU has increasingly asserted as “that it pursues security and 
development as mutually –enhancing policy objectives” (Youngs, 2007: 3). The two-way linkage is 
reflected in several documents, and the most quoted assertions are namely that “Security is the first 
condition of development” (ESS) or development is said to be necessary for security or security 
necessary for development. It is stated that security-development link will be promoted both in 
crisis management and in post crisis context. According to Young the “key link between 
development and security is judged to lie in support for democratic governance, which is stipulated 
as “fundamental for poverty reduction” and whose absence is part of the “root causes of violent 
conflict” (Young, 2007: 4). In spite of these declarations, we argue that the link between security 
and development policies needs to be examined by reference to concrete empirical cases and thus 
evaluated by the allocation of the finite resources and changes determined by these policies. These 
is mainly because, as it is argued in the literature “the EU still has no clearly thought out vision of 
the balance or direction of causality between these two policy goals, but rather an ad hoc approach 
based on the rather easy assumption that “all good things go together” (Young, 2007: 3). 
Therefore we argue that the two-way linkage between development and security 
policies has not produced any notable policy change and if the policies were linked this was done in 
order to be more effective in establishing peace in the conflict areas. In this context we want to 
emphasize that   in the DRC, European policy and instruments towards the country provide a more 
positive case of development-security linkage. One argument is that the Operation Artemis led to a 
new development cooperation commitment, particularly with a new focus on police training within 
which the Council and the Commission joined their respective approaches to security sector 
cooperation (Martinellli, 2006). Furthermore these security instruments were complemented by a 
200 million package of development and institution-building aid, which were introduced 
immediately after operation Artemis. However, from a critical perspective combined with the 
outputs of the EU instruments in the country, the EU’s attempts in assisting the economic 
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development in DRC have remained modest. Even more consistent is the argument that Artemis did 
not succeed in creating conditions for sustainable peace and instability is still continuing in DRC. 
Thus, the EU failed to joint military crisis management with wider peace building instruments. In 
practice there has been a weak link between security and development. 
Thus, as mentioned above, the link between security and development needs to be 
examined in every concrete case and it should not be limited to the EU statements and discourses.  
Based on these examinations it is not possible, as Olsen states, to claim that development aid 
buttressed the security goals of the EU in Africa and it is neither possible to argue the opposite 
(Olsen, 2008).    
5.2. Impact of EU policies towards DR Congo 
In the following we analyse the outcomes of the security and peace policies of the EU in DRC, 
namely the Operation Artemis, the EUFOR RD Operation and the Security Sector Reforms, with 
EUPOL and EUSEC. The outcomes of humanitarian aid and some of the development policies will 
be presented furthermore. This part will also briefly deal with the question on how the 
Europeanization process leads to the domestic changes in peace building.  
As mentioned in the empirical part of the project the Operation Artemis has been an 
effective operation in the sense that it could buy an immediate peace and stability in the 
administrative centre of Ituri region, Bunia. Moreover, this operation’s success allowed lots of 
displaced persons to come back to their homes. Economic situation was improved in the region, and 
many economic activities were revived. Besides that the temporarily ceased humanitarian assistance 
to the region was able to restore after the operation as well as the activities of the MONUC mission. 
In brief, the short-term outcomes of the operation were very positive, and could establish a 
temporary peace in the region.  
However, the limitation of Artemis was in the territorial and time limits of the 
operation. The time limit of the operation meant that even though it succeeded in establishing peace 
in short-term, it was unable to solve the security issues in the long term. It was an ad hoc mission 
and thus the absence of follow-up operations of this scope has diminished the effectiveness of the 
operation. Moreover, the fact that the operation was limited only to one region, Ituri, meant that the 
EU with this operation has failed to establish security and peace in the other regions of the country. 
Despite the fact that the peace was reached in this region and the armed groups’ violent activities 
were significantly reduced, the violence continued to occur in the other parts of the country. 
Nevertheless, despite the deficiencies of this Artemis Operation and the failure of the 
EU to provide the operations of same scope in the country, the operation paved the road “to other 
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ESDP operations12 which consolidated the EU’s contribution to peace and post-conflict 
reconstruction in the DRC” (Bagoyoko & Gibert, 2007: 19).  
The EUFOR operation’s mandate was limited to the city of Kinshasa and as a backup 
force for the MONUC. The fact that the mission’s forces served only as backup force, and being 
unable to use force at the time of necessity has diminished the importance and accountability of the 
operation especially in the eyes of the Congolese people (Martin, 2008). Moreover, the time limit of 
the operation is seen as a handicap of the mission, because the mission ended during the times of 
high tensions between the wining and loosing candidates’ proponents, which could have led to 
violence. On the other hand, however, the short time of the mission can be seen from the positive 
side, as Martin puts “deployment of European troops succeeded in using military force to achieve a 
short-term stabilization and create a space in which “normal” peaceable politics could be conducted. 
An extended mission would have prolonged the war footing of Congolese politics and sent mixed 
messages about political authority” (Martin, 2008: 93). Furthermore, this mission has succeeded in 
keeping peace and stability for a short time during the election process. However, this increased 
focus of the mission on the election process has undermined the issues of security and protection of 
the civilians. This has also increased suspicion in the eyes of the Congolese, who perceived the EU 
mission as a mission of Kabila. “The election campaign itself further aggravated abuses against 
opposition groups, individuals, and the media” (Martin, 2008: 97). Nevertheless, the EU has 
implemented projects which have been aimed at creating closer contact with the local population 
and increasing the image of the EU in the eyes of the Congolese people. These projects have gained 
considerable success for the EU side, since the public polls indicated that the number of people who 
believed in the neutrality of the EUFOR has increased from 30 to 50 % (Martin, 2008).  
In general, although the EUFOR RD Congo mission has succeeded in providing a 
short-term peace and stability during the elections in the country and thus contributed to the 
development of democracy in Congo, it had a limited impact on the ground. The EU itself has 
achieved more from the operation, by creating positive image among the Congolese people through 
their projects aimed at gaining people’s trust.  
Since the starting of the operation EUPOL on the security sector reforms in the 
country, which included training, mentoring, advising and monitoring of the police force of the 
DRC, the Congolese police officers showed some modest positive developments. The police have 
been provided with training and equipment. They have demonstrated on a number of occasions their 
ability to tackle demonstrations and protests. However, the police still suffer from an increased 
fragmentation, which is due to unequal training of the officers. “The unequal training of various 
                                                 
12 EUPOL, EUSEC and EUFOR operations  
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elements is causing acute problems at the officer level. Police are paid not according to their rank, 
but to their function.” (International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°104, 2006: 10). This has led to the 
unequal amount of wages between the policemen and thus tensions between them.  
Moreover, there has been a lack of exhaustive research on the government resources 
and policing needs and thus “donors have shaped individual units according to national preferences, 
philosophies and practices” which created a situation same as in the era of Mobutu, where some of 
the units were favoured more than others (International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°104, 2006). 
Following the projects of the EU and other donors, there wasn’t any improvement in the 
punishment of some crimes - crimes such as sexual assaults, are going without any punishment. 
Moreover, the head of the police has not much to say, as the minister of interior has more authority 
and appoints his own staff in the police.  
The aid provided to the DRC from the European Development Fund was mostly 
directed to the following sub-sectors: health sector, infrastructure and clean water supply, 
agricultural development and food safety, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities, restoration of 
justice and rule of law, democratic transition and electoral process, democratization and finally 
environment (Dessallien et al, 2007). However, for the purpose of our research we are going to look 
at the outcomes related to the issues of democratization process, justice and rule of law, post-
conflict reconstruction, although the issues of health, environment and agriculture and food safety 
are essential for the development.  
In the area of post-conflict reconstruction and social development, there have been 
some positive results, where the reconstruction activities took place in some areas of the country. 
Around 10-15 % of the population in the eastern part of the country has benefited from the activities 
of rehabilitation. The local NGO’s were mobilized, although this process lacked control and 
monitoring. Despite some failures in the post-conflict reconstruction in the Eastern provinces, there 
were many positive results as well, for instance health centres were built, water supply was 
improved, some agricultural activities were put in place. Moreover, improved infrastructure 
partially connected the south and north of the eastern provinces. Work on assistance to the 
administration in the districts was successfully done, and some success is seen in restoration of civil 
justice in the Ituri. However, as mentioned above there are of course, many failures, such as failure 
to finish the school and college building process in some areas, some deficiency with water supply 
(Dessallien et al, 2007).  
Within the building and strengthening of the roads in DRC objective some roads were 
successfully reopened and kept to minimal standards (for example, road between Kinshasa and 
Kenge, some roads in the western part of the country). However, the infrastructure development is 
 49
still at the deficient level. It is also difficult to see the final results because many of the projects are 
still running. In general the infrastructure did not improve the living conditions of the Congolese 
people, and the projects could not meet the immense needs. Moreover, absence of dialogue with the 
government didn’t do any good for the implementation of the road and traffic projects, so that the 
projects ended up being led by the emergency situations and not by proper management (Dessallien 
et al, 2007).    
In the relation to the justice and rule of law project PAJ has been implemented during 
2002-2006. The objectives of the project were highly important for the country, and the amount of 
the resources allocated to this objective was significant. As a result of the project the institutional 
capacity of the Ministry of Justice has been improved, especially regarding the planning and 
coordination of the justice sector. Moreover, the High Council of Judiciary (Conseil Supérieur de la 
Magistrature) became able to exercise its mandate on guaranteeing the independence of the 
judiciary. A document on the sectoral policy with an action plan, a capital spending and a medium-
term expenditure for the reform of the sector of justice was adopted. Furthermore, the functioning 
of the justice system and the public access to the justice in Kinshasa was improved (Dessallien et al, 
2007).  
In the framework of the democratic transition and electoral support there have been 
significant achievements. First of all the electoral security was achieved during the elections. The 
Independent election commission has been set up. In 2005 25 million voters have received the 
electoral identity cards, thanks to successful registration of the voters. The constitutional 
referendum of 2005 had a participation of 62 %, 84 % of which voted yes for the constitution. The 
participation for the presidential elections was with 70 %, where the president Kabila has won with 
58 % over his opponent, who publicly recognized the new elected president. In relation to the 
electoral security three police centres in Kisangani, Lubumbashi and Bukavu were rehabilitated. 
The national and provincial operational centres in Kinshasa were successfully rehabilitated. In 
general the success of the electoral process support is counted to be 90 %. The Congolese people 
received a guarantee to choose their own destiny by electing their president (Dessallien et al, 2007).  
Within the framework of the disarmament and demobilization assistance, one 
principal program and some other additional programs are taking place. The major program – 
Multi-country demobilization and reintegration program – is a large scaled project which involves 
11 donors and covers 7 countries (Angola, DRC, Congo, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Central 
African Republic). From the EU side, this program is financed from the 9th EDF. The objective of 
the program is to break the cycle of conflicts in the Great Lake Region. Within the program the 
National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration is being implemented with 
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the aim of disarmament of ex-militias, their integration into the army or civilian life, integration of 
18 brigades (each with 2500-3000 persons). The additional programs have the objectives of 
rehabilitation of two integrated brigades and providing them with equipment and a project which is 
directed towards the families of the soldiers in Bunia. 
As a result of the assistance provided in the area of disarmament and demobilization, a 
National Commission for Demobilization and Reintegration (CONADER – Commission Nationale 
pour la demobilisation et la réinsertion) was set up in 2003 and at the end of 2006 approximately 
130000 persons have passed through the commission. Moreover, at the end of 2006, 40000 people 
were integrated into the army, 90000 people chose demilitarization and received monthly 
allowances. However, the number of arms recovered was not very high. Some armed groups could 
not be demobilized at all. Some 10-25 % of the demobilized persons rejoined the armed groups 
(Dessallien et al, 2007; International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°104, 2006).   
The EU, its member states and other international donors have contributed financial 
and other means directed to establishment of stability, security and development in the DRC. The 
EU has been so far the largest donor to the country and with its policies and military activities, the 
EU has shown its engagement and interest in the country. The DRC, on the other hand, has 
achieved relative peace, the people of DRC have enjoyed their right to vote according to the 
democratic principles for the first time since 1965 and thus are on the right path to democracy.  
However, from the situation today, it is obvious that the peace is still very weak and far from being 
called sustainable, thus the impact of all the activities of the EU is relatively low.   
In order to measure the outputs of the EU security and development policies we need 
to examine, as indicated in our methodological part, to what extent EU polices in Congo were 
addressing the roots of the Congo conflict. This is necessary mainly because there is a general 
approach in peace building studies that one main step in establishing a sustainable peace is to 
address the roots of the conflict.  
Thus from EU polices and instruments launched towards DRC we have seen that EU 
addressed to some extent all the roots of the DRC conflict. Through the operation Artemis EU had 
been effective in establishing short-term peace in the Eastern part of the country and allowing the 
revival of the humanitarian assistance in the province of Ituri. In relation to the roots of the conflict, 
the operation has provided a ground for revival of economic activities in the province and allowed 
the internally displaced persons to return to their homes. Thus through operation Artemis EU 
addressed the economic dimension of the conflict and to some extent the ethnic one. However, 
when the ethnic dimension is concerned we argue that the ethnic disputes can’t be solved with a 
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short-term operation. It requires rather consolidation programmes which support inter-ethnical 
dialogue.  
As mentioned above, a strong security sector is a vital precondition for peaceful and 
well-functioning state. Thus the EU has directed some of its policies towards strengthening of the 
security sector in the DRC, which included training activities, together with provision of advice and 
monitoring. As mentioned before, there were few positive developments on this area of cooperation. 
Moreover, the EU has contributed to the strengthening of the Congolese army by reintegrating the 
former militia fighters into the army. Although there were some exceptions, large number of former 
fighters was successfully integrated to the army. Besides, the soldiers in the army have received 
their salaries and their families have also benefited from the EU assistance. Through these activities 
the EU addressed the issues related to the state capability to provide minimum security in the 
country. More than that, these activities of strengthening the security sector in the country, 
addressed the problem of privatization of the security. Besides that, the EU through its participation 
in the disarmament and demobilization program, to some extend has addressed the ethnical 
dimension of the conflict. Moreover, the external dimension of the conflict was covered by this 
program, where external and internal parties to the conflict were involved. This is essential, because 
the conflict as such is not the cause of internal factors, rather, it is a regional conflict with multiple 
actors.         
Furthermore, in the framework of the development assistance, the EU is providing 
some amounts to the post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. Although slow, the process of 
building infrastructure in the country has achieved some positive results. It is obvious that better 
infrastructure will not only strengthen the economy of the country, but will also serve as bridge 
between the people and different communities of the country. Moreover, the activities aimed at 
post-conflict reconstruction are aimed at benefiting the population to fulfil their basic needs, such as 
sanitation, clean water, health service and education. Besides that, the disarmament and 
demobilization program aimed at reintegration of the former militias into the civil life and national 
army, they got allowances, which allowed them to start normal lives.    
Through the different programs, as REJUSCO, EU POL and EUSEC, the EU has 
made efforts in strengthening the main attributions of the state, such as security, police and 
judiciary. Moreover, the support of electoral process gave the possibility for the Congolese people 
to give their vote in democratic elections for the first time in 40 years. This was a big step for the 
country’s movement towards democracy and state-building.  
As we can see, the activities of the EU in the DRC are covering all the roots of the 
conflict. The security issues were incorporated together with the development issues and the EU has 
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and is trying to contribute to the sustainable peace in the country by assisting the country’s security, 
institutions, economy and people by focusing on the roots of the conflicts. However, establishing 
sustainable peace is not just a matter of addressing and working on the root causes of the conflict, 
but also a process that requires taking into consideration other dimension, as dynamics of the 
conflict, good governance, human rights, rule of law.   
After presenting the impacts and the ways the EU addressed the roots of the conflict, 
we can say that the results on the ground are very modest. Explained from the Europeanization 
perspective, these impacts are determined by the relatively low pressure from the side of the EU to 
the Third World countries, the EU’s policy consistency, clearness and coherence and the DRC 
domestic factors. The following sections will be dealing with the EU policy consistency, clearness 
and coherence and the DRC domestic factors.  
5.2.1. The EU factors 
In this section we are going to make an analysis on how the EU’s policy consistence, clearness and 
coherence, and the special institutional framework of the EU, determine the effectiveness of their 
instruments in peace building process in DRC. This is important in order to understand why the EU 
is facing difficulties in acting on the ground and thus having modest impact in peace building 
process in Congo. Thus, in order to examine why EU’s instrument in establishing sustainable peace 
were not effective on the ground, we will try to answer to the question whether the EU policies and 
instruments towards Congo were consistent, coherent and clear, and to what extent the institutional 
framework of the EU played a role in accomplishing modest outputs in the peace building process.  
By investigating with a critical eye to what extend Operation Artemis was consistent 
and responded to Congolese needs, it is mentioned that the operation did not succeed in generating 
conditions for a sustainable peace and thus instability has persisted in the DRC. Critics charged the 
EU with a “failure to better link military crisis management with wider peace building in the DRC” 
(Saferworld – International Alert, 2006: 6). More than that Artemis involved some other challenges. 
For example it is important to underline that in the military field some military shortcomings were 
already known before the start of the operation, in particular a shortage of strategic transport was 
one challenge13. The Artemis operation showed that there was a “need for better and secure means 
for long distance communication, better information technology and the need to improve the 
interoperability of European Armed forces” (Homan, 2007: 4). The transitory nature of the 
operation (3 months) was a short-term operation and thus responded only to the needs of Bunia 
region and not of the whole country. When the member states are concerned, it was stresses by 
many analysts that “Artemis was more a French operation with an EU cover, than an EU operation 
                                                 
13 This problem was solved by leasing an aircraft from Ukraine.  
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led by the French” (Homan, 2007: 4). Thus it indicated to some extend that in Artemis the national 
efforts competed with those of the EU. Fearing the loss of national sovereignty, the member states 
were in reality obstacles to an effectively conducted operation.  
In terms of coordination among EU institutions we have to mention that on the ground 
cooperation between Artemis and humanitarian agencies were remarkably well. Summing up, all 
these obstacles and challenges faced by the EU before and during the Artemis indicate that the 
impact of this instrument on peace building was limited.  
When the EUFOR mission is concerned the main difficulties faced were concerning 
the EU Member states’ coordination and the capacity to act with the single voice on the 
international arena. The deployment of EUFOR RDC has met considerable delays due to difficulties 
in finding the framework nation behind the mission. “The needed capability in command and 
control facilities excludes the majority of the EU member states” (Hoebeke et al, 2007: 12). Thus 
only France, UK, and Germany could provide the highly qualified facilities to lead a multinational 
force. Because UK and France were not available, the country, which was pushed to perform this 
task, was Germany. This put the country in a very difficult position mainly because Germany has 
been hostile to the idea of any EU involvement in the management of Africa’s conflicts. 
Furthermore, Haines and Giegerich argued that EUFOR was in reality a cosmetic operation “more 
about European form than African substance, comforting rhetoric rather than relevant action” 
(Haines and Giegerich, 200614). Moreover, it was stressed that the mission’s main principle was 
more about French-German cohesion and the Union’s desire to boost the ESDP’s credibility after 
the failure of the rejected Constitution, and thus, the realities on the grounds in the DRC were only a 
secondary factor. This situation indicates once again the inconsistency in EU polices and thus the 
failure to respond to DRC needs.  
Moreover, regarding the time frame of the EUFOR it was also mentioned that a “short 
term military operations to ensure peace and stability during a crucial period of time can make 
sense, but only if they are part of a long-term strategy for the development of the region” (SDA 
Discussion Paper, 2007: 22). On the institutional level the lesson learned form the EUFOR mission 
in DRC is that there is a need for ensuring effective parliamentary control over ESDP operations. 
The claim made indicates that it is only Council of the EU that decides to launch and end an ESDP 
operation, and thus, there is an acute problem of parliamentary scrutiny over ESDP civilian and 
military operations.  
                                                 
14 Haine, Jean-Yves and Giegerich, Bastian: In Congo, a cosmetic EU Operation in International Herald Tribune, 2004-
09-30, http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/09/30/edkaldor_ed3_.php - retrieved in 05-05-2008  
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In regard to the operation EUPOL-Kinshasa it is of importance to emphasize that the 
setting up of the operation took a long time even though a small number of personnel was deployed. 
“When EUPOL- Kinshasa was entirely deployed, nearly 15 months had passed since the first 
declaration in favour of EU involvement in the reform of the police” (Hoebeke et al, 2007: 10). The 
delay on implementing the final component of the project was caused by internal disagreements 
within the EU about the form the project should take. Furthermore, an inter-pillar different 
institutional concept had an impact on the decision making process and the time schedule. Thus, the 
Commission was encouraging a small mission with a long-term involvement, while the Council 
favoured a crisis-management approach with a rapid response, so a short-term mission. For the 
Commission the long-term involvement was of main importance, with the good governance and 
transparency at the centre of preoccupations. On the other side, the Council had an interest in 
immediate stabilization and thus rapid reaction. These technical and political difficulties slowed 
down the development of the project.  
The question of whether EUPOL has reinforced the coherence and effectiveness of the 
EU actions, and whether the Union has contributed to the peace building process in DRC was 
answered by an analyst in the following way. Remacle stressed that “the Union has undeniably 
reinforced the coherence of its actions in the DRC and the legality of its presence in the eyes of the 
local actors” (Remarcle cited in Kinell, 2007: 26). However it was also mentioned that in spite of 
these improvements on the ground it is difficult to measure the result of the operation and thus the 
consistency of the instrument is questioned again. This situation is a clear example of how the 
institutional framework of the EU works and it appears that competition, rather than convergence 
remains the main trend in the EU’s inter-institutional relations. This is also one factor that impedes 
the EU’s effectiveness in peace building process in DRC. 
Another shortcoming of the EU’s instruments in the DRC is concerning the 
Community development programmes. Thus in spite of the fact that the programmes were 
extensive, they were containing some inconsistencies. For example, some of the programmes are 
encouraging the DRC to integrate in the world market without taking into the consideration what 
effects these policies will have on local economies. Because this can do more harm than good, as 
the economic governance programmes are not constructed to promote self-sufficiency and to 
strengthen the local capabilities. In this sense, “it can be devastating for a country emerging from a 
civil war to apply macroeconomic reforms to an economy crippled and distorted from years of 
warfare” (Jeong cited in Kinell, 2007: 28). Thus the consistency of the EU policies is questioned 
mainly because the EU policies are not all the time adjusted to the special needs of the country or 
because the domestic conditions of the country are emphasized superficially.  
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When financial instruments are concerned, in spite of the fact the EU is considered 
one of the largest donors in the DRC, the amount of money provided to the country is relatively low 
and insignificant in relation to the DRC needs and the complexity of political and socio-economical 
situation.  
Another problem referred to the EU’s policy consistency and coherence is the lack of 
common analysis at the EU level. Both the Commission and the Council design their analysis on 
different sources. This demonstrates a lack of coherence across the policy domains and thus 
diminishes EU’s policies’ functionality in peace building process.  
Taking into consideration the small size of the EU’s military mission it was argued 
that the DRC has constituted laboratory for the ESDP and CFSP in its ambition to test the EU’s 
capacity and effectiveness in peace building process in DRC. In spite of its engagement and 
relatively successful actions on the ground, the question of enhanced coherence and effective 
actions of EU instruments in DRC remains. It was revealed that some of the obstacles to a 
coordinated and coherent peace building effort occurred due to some reluctance of some Member 
States to partake in EU military operations and some Member States’ inclination to conduct mission 
and operations bilaterally. This situation puts pressure on the EU to make an attempt to coordinate 
its activities more effectively and, by doing so, synchronise the concerned institution’s different 
objectives and goals. But it is natural, that it is difficult to reach consensus, when three different 
decision making modes are employed, three key institutions are involved, together with the foreign 
ministries of the 27 Member states! 
In this part of analysis our aim was to present that the Union’s institutional and 
decision-making structure are the major determinants of the EU’s effectiveness in the peace 
building process in DRC. Therefore, we conclude from this part that the issue is not so much about 
the lack of the instruments but “rather in finding political will to overcome the structural thresholds 
and obstructions that the pillar system entails” (Kinell, 2007: 30). In order to be more effective on 
the ground (DRC) the EU will need much more effective cross-pillar cooperation than what is the 
case today. Apart from reforming the pillar structure, the EU’s short-term crisis response 
instruments used in DRC must be consistent and supplied with long-term development assistance.  
5.2.2. DRC domestic factors 
This part of the analysis will deal with the domestic factors of the DRC which are influencing the 
process of building the sustainable peace in the country. These factors are significant in order to 
understand the role of the DRC played in building sustainable peace in the country. Here we will 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the state in the DRC which play a role in the building of 
sustainable peace in the country.  
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As we know, the DRC is an artificial state, which was created by the westerners, 
without taking the different ethnic, cultural and social characteristics into the consideration. The 
DRC today has more than 200 different ethnic groups, some of which are competing with each 
other. The country has suffered from many decades of dictatorship of Mobutu, followed by the 
unsuccessful ruling of his successor, Kabila, the senior. At the beginning of the new millennium, 
the country was enduring violent wars, economic difficulties and large amount of budget deficit.  
As Buzan pointed out, the state consists of three elements: physical base, the idea of 
the state and the institutions to enforce those ideas. Thus the opening point in this analysis is related 
to the idea of the state. The DR Congo is not a nation-state, since it consists of different ethnic 
groups, which do not have national affiliations, but instead it’s a state-nation. Moreover, the state 
was not built based on the nationalism, which is one of the preconditions for nation-state building, 
but by the western colonizers. The colonial rule which has incorporated different territories into one 
unit without considering the social and ethnic features of these territories has led to the creation of a 
state, which is not unified on the basis of the nationalism, but on contrary, by force. Besides that, 
the colonial rule has increased the tensions between these ethnic groups, which heavily affected the 
building of a national identity among the population of Congo. Since in order to be a strong state, 
there should be a strong connection between the state and the nation, in the case of Congo, this bond 
is relatively weak due to the abovementioned reasons.  
Since it is the state that plays the instrumental role in the state-building, it is essential 
that the state is strong, institutionally and ideologically. From the point of organizational ideology, 
it is unclear as to how widely the ideas of the state are accepted by the population in DRC. The 
politics in the country are still done on the basis of ethnical or kinship affiliation, thus people view 
the government as an instrument of fulfilment of some certain ethnic groups’ interests, which are 
contested by the other groups in the society. This in return weakens the state’s autonomy and 
political foundation.  
The institutions of the state, as a state machinery and an instrument of implementation 
of the state ideas, is an important factor in the stability and well-functioning of the state. In the DRC 
the state apparatus has undergone recent changes through the democratic elections. However, the 
state institutions in Congo suffer from the lack of resources and training. The widespread corruption 
hinders the collection of revenues, which also causes the abovementioned lack of resources. The 
parliament of the country is very fragile and the president can lawfully dissemble the national 
assembly, which in return does not provide the national assembly with a motivation to criticise the 
president in the fear of being dissembled. Moreover, there is a lack of judicial independence, when 
the politicians still interfere in the issues of the judiciary. The ethnical and kinship affiliations are 
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very strong among the politicians and the state is not able to fully control the society, nor its 
officials are able to adhere to the official rules, which, according to Hyden is a characteristic of a 
weak and soft state. It is also clear that the state apparatus is unable to control its territory, nor the 
matters taking place on it. Besides that there is a big problem of privatization of the security sector, 
due to inability of the state to control this sector and provide with resources. This means that the 
military is using its forces not for the protection of the state, but for the money. All these issues 
show that the Congolese state institutions are still very weak and soft.   
As mentioned above, the Congolese state is not capable of controlling its territory. 
This is related to the next point, the physical base of the state. The physical base of state is the 
component of the state which is most vulnerable to the physical threats. In the case of Congo, the 
population, together with the territory were exposed to the multiple threats from the neighbours 
outside its borders and from internal conflicts. The Congolese state was not capable of controlling 
its population and territory and some of the natural resources. However, the revenues from those 
resources that the state was able to control, were highly concentrated in the central level, i.e. the 
local populations do not benefit from these revenues, but instead these are sent further to the central 
state. This means that the Congolese state cannot efficiently distribute the resources in its territory 
to its peoples.  
Concluding on the state in DRC we are looking at the certain conditions which show 
the weakness of the state, provided by Buzan. The state of Congo has many of these features of 
weak state. For instance, there is a high level of political violence, with different groups having 
different interests and trying to enforce these by force. Moreover, there is a lack of coherent 
national identity, where there are many different ethnic groups with different interests, represented 
by enormous amount of political parties. These parties in return, do not act according to the national 
interests, but according to those of particular group. Furthermore, lack of clear and observed 
hierarchy of the political authority is characteristic to the state of Congo. This is so, despite the 
legally established state institutions, because the rules are not being observed. This point is also 
strengthened by Hyden, where according to his typology of state, the disobedience of the state 
officials to official rules and their weakness of being influenced from the outside by political 
patrons are characteristics of a soft state.  
Concluding on the state factors that affect the success of peace building process in the 
DRC, it can be said that the state of Congo is still very weak and soft. This weakness and soft nature 
of the state is related to or caused by a number of factors. First of all, DRC is an artificial state, 
established by forceful means rather than by consolidation and the agreement. This has led to 
establishment of a state-nation with a lack of national consciousness. It is also important to 
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remember that the Congolese state is at a very early stage of state-building, with not even 50 years 
as an independent state. Moreover, in the pre-colonial times Congo did not have a state tradition as 
such, and at the independence it was not provided with significant assistance from the Belgian side 
on the building of state after a harsh colonization. “The current situation represents the 
superimposition of an overdeveloped, extractive, and predatory state upon the vestiges of traditional 
societies and an ethnic mosaic” (McCalpin, 2002: 33). Moreover, the features mentioned by Hyden, 
which are making the state weak, as lack of autonomy of state, patronage, reliance on informal 
rather than formal institutions, weak distinction between the public and private realm, concentration 
of resources and power, are all existent in the DRC. All these features that describe the state of 
DRC indicate the weakness and the soft nature of the state, which further proves its vulnerability to 
the external and internal threats.  
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6. Conclusion 
The main aim of this research was study the role of the EU security and development policies in 
establishing sustainable peace in the DRC. For this purpose, our first analytical step was to look at 
the evolution of the EU development and security policies towards Africa through historical 
institutionalism approach at a general level. We argued that the EU instruments to Africa were path 
dependent and were not influenced by the events of 9/11. Moreover, we have found that despite the 
general discourse on the EU level that the security and development are becoming more and more 
linked, in practice this linkage depends on the empirical case. For instance, in the case of DRC, this 
link was weak, in the sense that these policies were coordinated, but it is impossible to say that the 
security policies were buttressed by the development policies or vice-versa.  
The second and major analytical step in this research was directed towards finding the 
impact of the EU policies on the peace building in DRC. Here, we looked at the different 
instruments that the EU launched in relation to the peace building process in DRC. The instruments 
of the EU addressed the main root causes of the conflict in the country and directed towards them 
through following instruments. The Operation Artemis was the first independent military operation 
of the EU outside of its periphery. This operation has succeeded in establishing a short-term peace 
in Ituri province, and had an impact on the revival of the economic activities in the province. 
However, this operation was limited territorially and timewise, which means that the operation did 
not succeed to establish the peace in the long-term, and did not address the other parts of the 
country, where the violence continued.  
Another mission of the EU, which succeeded to establish a short-term peace in the 
country, particularly in Kinshasa, was the EUFOR-Kinshasa mission, with the aim to provide the 
stability during the election process. This mission had a limited mandate and thus limited impact on 
the ground. This is explained by the lack of enthusiasm from the side of Germany, where the troops 
were immediately withdrawn during the time of high tensions around the results of election. The 
mandate of this mission to protect the electoral process has undermined the issues of protection of 
civilians, which has increased the suspicions among the Congolese, who considered the mission as 
serving Kabila.  
The EUPOL program, within the security sector reform in the country has very limited 
impact on the ground. Although it had provided the police with training, advises and equipment, 
this was done not on an equal basis, which led to fragmentation in the police. Another program 
within the security sector reform is EUSEC, which is aimed at supporting the Congolese authorities 
in charge of security to comply with the democratic principles.  
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In the framework of capacity building of judiciary, the program RAJ was 
implemented for 4 years, which was followed by the REJUSCO program, with the aim of 
supporting the capacity building of the judiciary in the Eastern part of the country. As a result of 
these programs, the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Justice has been improved, especially 
regarding the planning and coordination of the justice sector. Moreover, the High Council of 
Judiciary (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature) became able to exercise its mandate on 
guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary. Furthermore, the functioning of the justice system 
and the public access to the justice in Kinshasa was improved.   
From the abovementioned, we can conclude that despite the fact that the EU had a 
variety of instruments towards DRC and succeeded to address some of the root causes of the 
conflict, the impact on the ground was modest.  
Furthermore, in this project we wanted to examine which factors determined the 
above impact in peace building process. Thus we looked at the EU factors and DRC domestic 
factors. When the EU factors are concerned, the consistence, clearness and coherence of the EU 
policies and instruments are playing a major role. Moreover, the effectiveness of the EU 
instruments in the DRC was determined by the coordination among the EU institutions, the 
decision-making procedures and the EU’s ability to act with single voice.  
When it comes to the DRC domestic factors, we have concluded that the DRC state is 
still in the process of the state-building and lacks the capacity to contribute to the peace building 
process. But this is not to say that the state in DRC is the main cause of conflict and 
underdevelopment. There are numerous other historical, social, political aspects, which weakened 
the state and its institutions. These internal and external aspects have largely hindered the peace 
building process in the country.  
The conflict in the DRC has a very complex nature, involving multiplicity of actors 
and diverse factors. That is why the peace building process is a problematic issue, which requires a 
complex approach. The EU’s approach to the DRC conflict is limited compared to the extent of the 
conflict and the country’s needs. Therefore, the sustainable peace in the DRC can be achieved if the 
efforts of the EU are coordinated with the other international actors. Moreover, the EU, together 
with these international actors, must address the complexities on the ground. In order for the EU to 
succeed to establish the sustainable peace in the country, the EU needs to reshape its policies 
according to the political, socio-economic context of the DRC, instead of applying policies which 
measure their own capabilities and interests.     
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7. Perspectivation  
In this part we want to make a discussion on whether there is a solution for DRC and how the 
international actors can frame their policies towards DRC in order to be more effective in the peace 
building process.  
As the things look today in DRC, it seems that this case is almost “hopeless”. There is 
a huge debate in the literature on the best solution for the country. One of the solutions for the DRC 
concerns the decentralization. Decentralization could promote conflict resolution and accountability 
by diminishing the distance between the citizens and authority. This could become a channel 
through which to promote accountability, intercultural dialogue and the strengthening the 
cooperation between the central government and local authorities. On the other hand, however, the 
decentralization, if not implemented justly, could lead to bigger corruption and uncontrolled 
government spending. This could increase the tensions over the resources at all levels. Another 
weakness with the decentralization is related to the differences among the different regions in the 
country, since there is a danger that this could lead to even more pronounced disparities between the 
poor and rich regions. Therefore a solution to this can be equalization funds, which will distribute 
the wealth equally among the provinces. However, in order to function successfully, as 
decentralized state, it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of the local authorities, so that these 
will be able to sustain a well-functioning and autonomous administration. In the case the 
decentralization is badly implemented, this can lead to a creation of the new layer of state officials, 
more corrupted and inefficient, thus transferring the problems from the central to local level.  
Another solution to the DRC can be a separation of the state. This could lead to more 
control over the territories and people and it could be that it would be easier to administer the small-
scaled countries. However, the risk of this solution can be that one weak state will be replaced with 
many weak states, in the case of bad management of these states. Especially, it could be due to lack 
of experience of the local authorities. Moreover, the question of dividing the country itself is 
problematic, especially when it comes to on what basis the country can be divided, e.g. ethnical or 
province basis. The division of the country by administrative provinces can be problematic because 
these provinces were built themselves as a result of artificial division. Thus the ethnical division can 
perhaps work as a solution, although there could be some problems and disputes over the control of 
natural resources.  
If the integration of the state should be sustained as it exists today, there is a strong 
need for strengthening of the state and its institutions, their accountability and transparency, and the 
power should be balanced between the central government and the provinces, and between the 
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branches of the government. Thus a great deal of attention must be paid to the strengthening of 
these institutions. If the institutions of the state are strong, they will be able to deal with the conflict 
resolution issues on their own, without involvement from the international actors.  
In order to establish sustainable peace in the DRC, the international community must 
coordinate their efforts in the country due to the extent of the conflict and scale of the country 
(territorially and population). Because the efforts from the international donors often reflected their 
own interests and own ways of doing things, this has diminished the effectiveness of these policies. 
Moreover, there is a need for better financial instruments and higher amount of financial assistance. 
Besides that, the international community’s policies and instruments towards DRC must be oriented 
towards the realities on the ground, thus the political, socio-economic and cultural contexts must be 
reflected. This is so, because the “western way of doing things” might not necessarily fit into the 
DRC context. Furthermore, the international community must address the problems on the regional 
scale and not just limited to DRC, since the conflict itself is involving the whole Great Lakes 
region.  
Finally, the international community is in need to carry out longer-term policies 
towards DRC. This is so, because with the short-term instruments they might win a fight, but not 
the peace.      
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9.2.  The financing of the EU missions in the DRC15  
 
 Responsible 
institution 
Invested funds 
(Euro) 
Funds origin 
 
Development 
cooperation   
Commission 780 million (ongoing 
projects) 
Commission/EDF 
Electoral process  Commission 165 million Commission/ EDF 
 
Election observing 
mission 
Parliament 9.4 million Commission/EIDHR 
(European Initiative 
for Democracy and 
Human Rights)  
Artemis Council/CFSP + 
Commission 
7 million 
 
 
46.58 million 
(estimation for France) 
Common costs (“ad 
hoc” fund) 
 
+other member states 
(“costs lie where there 
fall principle”) 
Ituri/justice   7.9 million Commission 
(REJUSCO) 
EUPOL- Kinshasa  Commission + 
Council/CFSP 
6 million + 1.05 
million 
2.3 million 
585,000 + 7.87 million 
Commission + RRM 
 
Member states 
Council/CFSP 
EUSEC RDC Council/CFSP + 
Commission 
6,591,600 
800,000 
Council/CFSP 
Commission 
(“flanking measures”) 
EUFOR RDC Council/CFSP Total: 60 million 
(including common 
costs: 16.7 million) 
Athena mechanism  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Hoebeke et al, 2007: 16 
